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Period fertility rates fell to previously unseen low levels in a large number of 
countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of Total Fertility Rates under 
1.3 raised the possibility of dramatic, rapid population aging as well as population 
decline. In an analysis of recent trends, we find, however, a widespread turn-around in 
so-called “lowest-low” fertility countries. The reversal has been particularly vigorous 
in Europe. The number of countries with period total fertility rates less than 1.3 fell 
from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008, of which four (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) are in East Asia. Moreover, the upturn in the period TFR was not confined to 
lowest-fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the 
demographic explanations for the recent rise in fertility stemming from fertility timing 
effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic 
crisis may push down fertility in the short-run, we conclude that formerly lowest-low 
fertility countries should continue to see further increase in fertility as the transitory 
effects of shifts to later motherhood become less and less important. 
 
  11. Introduction 
 
In the 1990s, period total fertility rates (TFR) fell below 1.3 in Eastern and Southern 
Europe and East Asian countries. It looked as if a new era of extremely low birth rates 
had taken hold. While below-replacement fertility has appeared in various forms on 
and off since the 1930s, the fertility rates seen in the 1990s were so low that, if 
continued, could lead to rapid depopulation, or as Chesnais (2001) termed it 
‘population implosion‘. These new lows in fertility inspired a large literature, notably 
Bongaarts and Feeney’s (1998) work on tempo-adjusted fertility, Kohler, Billari, and 
Ortega’s (2002 and 2006) exploration of the patterns and causes of ‘lowest-low 
fertility’ and Lutz et al.’s (2005, 2006) notion of a low-fertility trap in which falls in 
fertility could be self-reinforcing. Some official forecasts also shifted to the idea that 
fertility would stay low and do not predict any substantial increase. For example, in 
Japan official forecasts are for the TFR to stay below 1.3 until at least 2050 (Kaneko 
et al. 2008).  
 
Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002 and 2006) and Billari and Kohler (2004) invented 
the label ‘lowest-low fertility’, a level that they arbitrarily set for a period TFR below 
1.3. The term does not refer to the lower limit of fertility, but rather to new lows in 
observed period fertility rates.
1 They concluded that countries with such low fertility 
displayed a systematic pattern “characterized by a rapid shift to delayed childbearing, 
a low probability of progression after the first child (but not particularly low levels of 
first-birth childbearing), a ‘falling behind’ in cohort fertility at relatively late ages (in 
Southern Europe), and a reversal in the relative ranking of lowest-low fertility 
countries in a European comparison of total fertility levels.” (Kohler, Billari, and 
Ortega 2006: 99). They expected that ‘lowest-low fertility’ would be a persistent 
pattern for several decades, especially in Eastern Europe, and present a considerable 
challenge for many developed countries. They also predicted the phenomenon of 
‘lowest-low’ fertility was likely to spread, particularly in the German-speaking world 
(Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002 and 2006).  
 
The prospect of prolonged periods of very low fertility has frightened and fascinated 
generations of demographers, journalists, and general public in Europe and in the 
United States over the last century. The interest in extreme low fertility lies in its 
hypothetical consequences for long-term population trends, involving both accelerated 
rate of population ageing and population decline. In the literature demography most 
commonly creeps in through the “twin horrors of population decline and population 
excess” (Shriver 2003: 153) and the first of these ‘horrors,’ coupled with the notion 
that the human species (or Europe, ‘Western civilization’, etc.) may fail to reproduce 
themselves, was commonly evoked in the 1920s-1930s and, more recently, since the 
1970s onwards (see Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). Even in the United States, which 
                                                 
1 The term ‘lowest-low fertility’ introduced by Kohler et al. has been subject to criticism. Early readers 
of this paper objected to us re-using the term. It is clear that there is no natural lower limit to fertility, 
and so the term does not refer to the lowest fertility that can be attained. Further, if the term is used 
only to designate the set of fertility rates seen among the lowest of the low fertility countries, then it has 
a shifting meaning that does not correspond to an absolute cut-off below 1.3. However, we feel that the 
designation of populations with period fertility less than 1.3 is a meaningful one that does capture a 
phenomenon of period fertility that is far below replacement. One might wish that Kohler et al. had 
used a different term but it is difficult to invent a better one: ‘extremely low fertility’, ‘far below-
replacement fertility’, ‘sub-sub replacement fertility’ and ‘ultra-low fertility’ may all convey the same 
meaning but are not clearly better, and certainly none has the same catchiness. 
  2record the highest fertility among industrialized countries and experience sustained 
population growth, books like The Empty Cradle by Philip Longman (2004) warn of 
population decline, loss of economic prosperity and innovativeness. In Europe, Pope 
Benedict XVI proposed in 2006
2 that its problem seems to be that “it no longer wants 
to have children” and it “seems to be wishing to take its leave from history.”
3 A 
specific area of concern is how low fertility can decline (Golini 1998) and whether 
there might be a downward spiral in fertility rates in the future (Lutz, Skirbekk, and 
Testa 2006). 
 
It comes as news therefore that period fertility in most low and ‘lowest-low’ fertility 
countries has been steadily rising after 2000. Countries as diverse as Spain, Italy, 
Russia, and Japan all appear to have their lowest fertility rates behind them, even if 
slightly. Now there are only a handful of countries with TFRs below 1.3, compared to 
21 in 2003 and only one European country, Moldova, remains in this category 
according to the official estimates for 2008. Period TFR has clearly risen from its 
lowest levels in Central and Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Ukraine and East Germany—where fertility below the lowest-low level persisted for 
10 to 13 years—TFRs reached 1.4 or above by 2008. East Germany whose TFR was 
as low as 0.77 in 1994 had 1.40 in 2008. In Southern Europe, period TFRs have risen 
over 1.4 for Italy, Spain, and Greece. In East Asia, the record is mixed. Japan’s TFR 
has risen above 1.3, whereas in Taiwan, the TFR fell to an all-time low of 1.05 in 
2008 (see Figure 1). 
 
<Figure 1 around here> 
 
In this paper we provide a demographic analysis of this apparent reversal in lowest-
low fertility and explore a variety of factors that help explaining the observed 
changes. While we also pay attention to the notable rise in the period TFR in the more 
developed countries that never experienced lowest-low fertility, our predominant 
focus is on the diverse group of countries that have registered at least a brief TFR 
decline below 1.3 after 1990. The TFR threshold of 1.3 is arbitrary, but we consider it 
an important and useful marker of extreme low fertility for both practical and 
theoretical reasons. On the practical side, we argue that such an extreme low fertility 
is unlikely to persist and is unlikely to be achieved by any birth cohort of women. On 
the theoretical side, the long-term continuation of the TFR below 1.3 may be seen as 
‘unsustainable.’ In terms of population halving times, the difference between 
relatively close levels of low fertility is dramatic. Stable populations with no 
migration and with a TFR of 1.3 take about 45 years to halve, whereas those with a 
TFR of 1.6 take nearly 90 years. Arguably, TFR levels of 1.5 or 1.6 can be much 
more easily accommodated with a combination of moderate immigration and 
continuing reforms of labor market and social security systems. At the same time, it is 
important to keep in mind that there is nothing magical about this frontier. The 
                                                 
2 Christmas Greetings to the Roman Curia, accessed at 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe
_20061222_curia-romana_en.html>. 
3 A nice example of a similarly dramatic vision is J.J. Spengler’s (1932 [1991: 169]) warning of an 
imminent decline of Western civilization due to human unwillingness to bear children, brought about 
by the competition for wealth under capitalism: “Western civilization has altered the psychology of 
man. It has destroyed the motive which (…) has induced man to procreate its kind.”  
  3difference between the TFR slightly under 1.3 and slightly over 1.3 is definitional, 
and is not a difference in kind.
4  
 
Our main contribution is that we are now able to provide a detailed analysis of the 
path that fertility has taken in almost all of the countries that have or at one time had 
‘lowest-low’ levels of the period TFR. This analysis allows us to both describe what 
has happened and advance the modeling of postponement transitions. In addition to 
description and tempo-quantum analysis, we also examine the power of economic, 
policy, and migration-related factors to explain short-term TFR changes among the 
‘lowest-low’ and low-fertility countries. We do not analyze long-term factors that 
have been suggested as possible drivers of fertility increase, such as cultural and value 
changes making societies more conducive to family formation (Billari 2008, Sobotka 
2008b), or the rise in gender equality, in economic opportunities and the division of 
household tasks.
5 The concluding general discussion offers a new look at the idea of 
‘tempo transitions’ and discusses the prospects for a resumption of lowest-low fertility 
as a result of the economic crisis. 
 
 
2. Explanations of lowest-low fertility 
 
A theme running through our analysis is that lowest-low fertility should be thought of 
as a transitional phenomenon closely linked to the postponement of childbearing from 
younger to older ages. Much of the sensationalism about extremely low fertility has 
come as a result of public misunderstanding of the period Total Fertility Rate, which 
is often simply described as the number of children per woman (e.g., Sobotka and 
Lutz 2009).
6 As has been known among demographers since the works of Hajnal 
(1947) and especially Ryder (1964), and recently repopularized by Bongaarts and 
Feeney (1998), delays in the timing of childbirth can have dramatic effects on cross-
sectional measure such as the period TFR. When births are postponed to older ages, 
they reduce the number of births seen in a given period, making the period TFR lower 
even if cohort fertility remains unchanged. 
 
Within the discipline of demography, a broad agreement exists among demographers 
that the era of lowest-low fertility emerged as a direct consequence of rapid fertility 
postponement (Kohler et al. 2002, Lutz et al. 2003, Morgan 2003, Sobotka 2004a, 
Billari 2008). But the questions of how permanent lowest-low fertility would be and 
whether other factors than postponement can sustain such a low fertility have 
produced a divided set of predictions and interpretations. Not surprisingly, the 
proponents of the prominent role of tempo effects tend to argue that lowest-low 
fertility would end once delays in fertility weaken or come to an end. Bongaarts (2001 
                                                 
4 For simplicity we often refer to the period TFR as ‘period fertility’ or simply as ‘fertility’ although 
other indicators might be more suitable for its measurement. We avoid, however, a ‘children-per-
woman’ interpretation of the period TFR. 
5 We did not include such an analysis both because of the difficulty in measuring cultural and value 
changes on a year-to-year basis and because we suspect that such cultural processes unfold relatively 
slowly and are not primarily responsible for short terms ups and downs in fertility. 
6 The distinction between period and cohort fertility and the potential misinterpretations of the period 
TFR produced headlines and controversy even in relatively high-fertility France in the debate between 
Calot and Le Bras (see Keyfitz 1993). 
  4and 2002) and Sobotka (2004a) both suggested that lowest-low fertility was a 
transient phenomenon, which they expected to end soon. The majority of official 
population projections followed this view, projecting increases in lowest-low fertility 
from observed levels under 1.3 children per woman to levels above 1.5. The earlier 
examples of the United States and the Netherlands, where postponement lowered 
period fertility temporarily, after which fertility rose again were used as examples of 
short-lived ‘tempo transitions.’ 
 
Many researchers, however, offered arguments on why lowest-low fertility might 
prove persistent.
7 These views can be roughly divided into two streams. The first 
emphasizes the continuation of tempo-induced declines in fertility and their potential 
later consequences. The second emphasizes the socio-economic and cultural 
conditions of lowest-low fertility societies.  
 
Consistent with the former view, it can be argued that once postponement of 
childbearing stops and the associated tempo distortion disappears, additional decline 
in fertility quantum may prevent the TFR from rising above the 1.3 threshold. This 
argument has been repeatedly pursued without explicitly referring to extreme low 
fertility threshold (see Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999, Bongaarts 2002). Consequently, 
the period of lowest-low fertility could become long-lasting or even permanent. 
Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002 and 2006) pointed out that in some countries, 
especially in Eastern Europe, postponement could continue for many decades: early 
childbearing during the state-socialist era created much room for prolonged 
postponement, even without a change in desired family size. Furthermore, they 
emphasized that underlying levels of cohort fertility quantum were also likely to 
decline as a result of postponed fertility. Reasons for continuation or even further 
decline of lowest-low fertility were put forth in the form of the ‘low fertility trap’ 
(Lutz, Skirbekk, and Testa 2006). This is a hypothesis of negative feedback, in which 
tempo-induced declines in the birth rate lead to further declines in desired family size 
and the accelerated population aging creates further economic hardships for young 
adults.  
 
A number of scholars view very low fertility as a long-lasting outcome of socio-
economic and cultural conditions that are disadvantageous for childbearing. 
McDonald (2006: 487) suggested that waiting for tempo effect to disappear “is 
beginning to look like waiting for Godot” and proposed that there is a “cultural 
divide” between populations that can maintain period fertility above 1.5 and those that 
cannot, with the possibility of increasing fertility becoming harder and harder in less 
child-friendly societies. He repeatedly stressed (McDonald 2000, 2002, 2006) low 
levels of gender equity in the family and a strong reliance of individuals on their 
family networks in countries where families are expected to support their own 
members and where universal welfare system is less developed as reasons for 
sustained low fertility. Suzuki (2003: 12) argues that “[o]ne way to look at lowest-low 
fertility is to see it as a normal response to socioeconomic changes in the postmaterial 
era.” In a twist to McDonald’s arguments about the role of the family as a welfare 
institution, he proposes that only countries with weak family ties, such as north-
western Europe, have developed a sufficient network of non-family care, which 
                                                 
7 Although our paper mostly focuses on the ‘lowest-low fertility,’, we also refer here to the 
contributions that are concerned about ‘very low fertility’ or ‘extreme low fertility,’ without making 
explicit reference to the TFR threshold of 1.3. 
  5enables women to have more children and mothers to participate easily in the labour 
force. Reher (2007) and Chesnais (2000) also view extremely low fertility and the 
concomitant prolonged population decline as irreversible, long-term aspects of the 
developed world, although for different reasons. Reher sees it essentially as an 
outcome of demographic transition, while Chesnais stresses the role of social 
atomisation, individualism and consumerist culture.    
 
Although we cannot review here all the other relevant factors that have been put 
forward to explain extreme low fertility levels we shall selectively outline some of 
them. Adserà (2004 and 2005) emphasizes the role of labor market institutions, 
especially of unemployment, in driving fertility to very low levels. In her simulation, 
the TFR in countries with high and persistent female unemployment was estimated as 
low as 1.28 (Adserà 2005: 192). Kohler et al. (2006) and Billari (2008: 171) highlight 
the heterogeneity of lowest-low fertility settings. In Southern Europe, especially in 
Italy and Spain, lowest-low fertility is associated with the persistence of more 
traditional family patterns, late home leaving, a shift to a very late first birth timing, 
relatively low female employment, and also disadvantaged labour market position and 
high unemployment among young adults (Billari and Kohler 2004, Billari 2008; see 
also Baizán et al. 2002, Simó Noguera et al. 2005, Dalla Zuanna 2001). Many 
analogies can be drawn between the more traditional family system in Southern 
Europe (which has been nevertheless eroding rapidly in the last decade, e.g., Rosina 
and Fraboni 2004, Billari 2008, Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2009) and East Asia.
8 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, family behaviour has changed faster and earlier than in 
Southern Europe and Eastern Asia. Especially Central Europe has experienced a 
remarkable shift to later childbearing, but lowest-low fertility in this region is also 
frequently perceived as a consequence of a painful economic transition after the 
collapse of state socialism around 1990 (e.g., Sobotka 2004b, Frejka 2008). This 
argument is most compelling for the former Soviet Union.
9 Furthermore, in analogy 
to Southern Europe and East Asia, conservative gender roles attitudes combined with 
a need for female employment also contributed to very low fertility.  
                                                
 
The long-lasting view of lowest-low fertility rates has also appeared in official 
population projections, often as a ‘Low scenario’, but at least in the case of Japan and 
Hong Kong as the central or ‘Medium scenario’. As a series of projections predicting 
a recovery of fertility proved repeatedly wrong, the latest version of Japan’s official 
populating projection, released in 2006, predicts period fertility rates below 1.3 out to 
 
8 In Japan, non-marital fertility remains negligible and stigmatised; at the same time, marriages have 
been increasingly postponed or foregone (Raymo 1998, Retherford et al. 2001). A combination of 
declining marriage attractiveness and higher sexual permissiveness has led to a rise of non-cohabiting 
partnership relations (Iwasawa 2004). Together with a very low normative acceptance of extramarital 
childbearing this trend constitutes a compelling reason for very low fertility in Japan (e.g., Ogawa 
2003). Other analogies between Japan and Southern Europe can be made with respect to disadvantaged 
labour market position of young adults and mothers, who often get low-paid irregular jobs (OECD 
2003, Boling 2008). In addition, Japanese women face an uphill struggle when trying to combine work 
and motherhood (Boling 2008). Finally, Shirahase (2000) suggests that Japanese society is 
characterised by “systematically and hierarchically ordered timetable based on age,” which limits 
individuals’ flexibility in making important life course decision and further depresses the birth rate. 
9 In a study on Ukraine, Perelli-Harris (2005) suggested that lowest-low fertility there has been largely 
driven by the decline in second birth rates as economic factors like poverty and unemployment “make a 
second child prohibitively expensive for the average family” (p. 68 ). 
  6at least 2055 (Kaneko et al. 2008 and 2009; the low variant envisions a TFR below 
1.1 between 2009 and 2055). In Hong Kong, the total fertility is projected to decrease 
to 0.9 children per woman by 2016 and remain at that level through 2036 (Census and 
Statistics Department 2007: 44). In Germany, official projections include a sustained 
decline to 1.2 children per woman through 2050 as part of their ‘Low scenario’. (The 
Medium scenario has a TFR of 1.4). The ‘Low variant’ of the 2008 UN world 
population projections (UN 2009) shows extreme low TFR levels throughout the 
whole projection period until 2050, often falling below 1.0 in Eastern Europe and East 
Asia. For instance, this scenario envisions that in Belarus the TFR would hit a trough 
of 0.86 in 2020-25, whereas in Hong Kong it would fall as low as to 0.61 in the same 
period. Also cohort fertility is occasionally projected to fall to 1.3 or below. Frejka 
and Sardon (2004: 376) suggested that women born in 1975 may reach a completed 
fertility of 1.2 in Italy, 1.2-1.3 in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and 1.3-1.4 in 




3. The spread and the subsequent retreat of ‘lowest-low’ total fertility 
rate 
 
With the exception of wars and extreme events, the lowest-low fertility is a relatively 
recent phenomenon (e.g., Billari 2008). Among larger countries it first took place in 
Western Germany (by then Federal Republic of Germany), where the period TFR 
briefly fell below 1.3 in 1984-1985 (Table 1). At the same time, several European 
countries including Italy and the Netherlands experienced a TFR falling below 1.5. It 
was only a decade later that the lowest-low fertility became widespread in many 
regions of Europe and later also in Armenia and in East Asia. Excluding countries 
with population below one million and countries with unreliable population statistics 
(most notably, Bosnia and Herzegovina), the number of countries with the lowest-low 
fertility increased rapidly from two in 1991-92 (East Germany and Hong Kong) to 21 
in 2003 (Figure 2, we consider East and West Germany as separate regions in this 
analysis). By then, Italy, Spain, most post-communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan joined this group. In total, 479 
million people lived in countries with the lowest-low period fertility level (Figure 3); 
in Europe more than half of the total population lived in these countries in 2001 
(Sobotka 2004a).
10 Starting in 2003, the number of European countries with lowest-
low fertility began to fall steadily, from 16 in 2002 to one in 2008 (Moldova, with a 
population of 4 million and sizeable emigration is the only remaining country in the 
group), whereas in East Asia, four out of five countries ever experiencing lowest-low 
fertility still retained it in 2008 (Hong Kong, Singapore, (South) Korea, and Taiwan, 
whereas Japan has recorded higher fertility rates since 2007.  
 
<Figures 2 and 3 around here> 
 
A listing of countries experiencing ‘lowest-low fertility’ during the period 1984-2008 
is shown in Table 1. In this table, we also include countries that have seen the TFR 
below 1.4 in order to see better the pervasiveness of the recent increase in fertility. 
                                                 
10 Total population of all countries that have experienced a spell of lowest-low fertility after 1980 
amounts to 715 million in 2008.  
  7This is a mixed group of middle-sized countries from different parts of Europe, but it 
also includes Georgia and the lowest-fertility country of the Americas, Cuba, where 
the TFR fell to 1.39 in 2006 (ONE 2008).
11 Among these countries, Denmark stands 
out for both an early fall in the TFR to very low levels (the TFR fell to 1.38 in 1983) 
and its steady subsequent recovery to 1.89 in 2008, which brought Denmark into the 
group of countries with the highest period TFR in Europe.
12 Finally, the table shows 
selected ‘higher-fertility’ developed countries that also experienced notable recovery 
in the period TFR during the last decade or two. Clearly, the trend of increasing 
period TFR has not been limited to the countries with extreme low fertility, but took 
place across the whole developed world. Consequently, eight developed countries 
currently record the TFR above 1.9, with New Zealand (2.18) and the United States 
(2.12) achieving above-replacement fertility. The United States is also peculiar in 
having experienced its lowest TFR level as early as in 1976. 
 
<Table 1 around here> 
 
The phenomenon of the lowest-low fertility differed widely between countries in 
duration as well as in the lowest level of the period TFR reached. Some countries 
encountered a very brief period of the TFR below 1.3, while ten countries including 
Italy, Russia, Spain and Ukraine experienced ten or more years of such low TFR level 
(Table 1). Some countries have seen the period TFR temporarily plummeting below 
1.0, with Eastern Germany going down to 0.77 in 1993-94, shortly after German 
unification (Witte and Wagner 1995, Conrad et al. 1996). Russia, with a population of 
142 million was the most populous country experiencing a spell of the lowest-low 
fertility; Japan with a population of 128 million briefly experienced lowest-low 
fertility in 2003-2005, as did five countries with population of 38-48 million (Italy, 
Korea, Poland, Spain, and Ukraine). By 2008, however, the global population living 
in countries with lowest-low fertility shrank to less than one fifth of its peak value in 
2002, to 88 million, out of which only 4 million resided in Europe (Figure 3).  
 
Although we focus mostly on individual countries, regional-level variation should 
also be highlighted. China as a whole has a sub-replacement fertility level at least 
since the 1990s, but the levels of the TFR are highly uncertain as serious 
underreporting of births occurs in vital statistics (Morgan et al. 2009).
13 Our estimate, 
based on the 2000 population Census data and the analysis published by National 
Bureau of Statistics and East-West Center (NBS 2007) is presented in Appendix 2 
(Table S1). Using different thresholds of the reported TFR, we arrive at the estimate 
of six to twelve provinces with 12 to 37 percent of China population having lowest-
low fertility in 2000, with the main variant estimate of eight provinces with almost 
one fifth of China population (245 million). All these provinces except Hubei are 
situated alongside the Eastern coast and include the capital city of Beijing and the 
                                                 
11 Our list of very low fertility countries would not change much if we included all the countries that 
have experienced a TFR decline below 1.5, seen by McDonald (2006) as marking a divide between 
countries with ‘very low fertility’ and ‘moderately high fertility’.  
12 Denmark also constitutes an exception in cohort fertility trends as it is probably the only 
industrialized country where women born in the 1960s actually experienced a slight increase in their 
completed fertility (e.g., Frejka and Sobotka 2008). 
13 Different estimates of the TFR in China around 2000—when population census was conducted—
range from 1.22 to 2.3 (Lutz et al. 2007), with a number of experts converging at 1.4 to 1.6 (e.g., 
Retherford et al. 2005; Zhang and Zhao 2006, Morgan et al. 2009). 
  8most populous city, Shanghai.
14 Adding China provinces to the countries with lowest-
low fertility, and assuming that the findings for China for the year 2000 pertain also to 
the subsequent period, the global population of countries and regions with the TFR 
below 1.3 can be estimated in its peak period around 2002 at 700-900 million, i.e. 11-
14 percent of global population.  
 
Quebec, Canada’s second most populous province is also notable for its low levels of 
the period TFR, which reached a low of 1.37 in 1987 but has since risen, reaching 
1.67 in 1992, later declining and rising again (INSPQ 2008). While Italy and Spain 
can be counted among the ‘trend-setters’ of lowest-low fertility, some of their regions 
recorded a particularly early onset and long spells of lowest-low fertility and, 
subsequently, a remarkable and rather unexpected recovery (see also Billari 2008). 
Northern Italy, which has a long history of low fertility, experienced 23 years of the 
TFR below 1.3, starting in 1981 as compared with 12 years for Italy as such. North 
Italian province of Emilia-Romagna, which used to be a showcase of very low fertility 
throughout the post-WW II period, recorded 25 years of the TFR below 1.3 between 
1979 and 2003 (Figure 4). A recent reversal, when the TFR in the North of Italy as 
well as in the province of Emilia-Romagna got slightly ahead of the Italian TFR, is 
remarkable. In these regions, the estimated TFR for 2008 was 1.45 as compared with 
1.41 for Italy, up from 1.04 reached in the North in 1994 and 0.94 reached in Emilia 
already in 1987 (ISTAT 2009a and 2009b; see also Caltabiano 2008). In Spain, many 
regions first experienced lowest-low fertility in the second half of the 1980s and by 
1990 ten out of the 17 autonomous communities had a TFR below 1.3, with Asturia 
and the Basque country falling below 1.0. In five of these regions fertility recovered 
above 1.3 as of 2007 (INE 2009c), increasing by 0.3-0.4 from the lowest level reached 
around then mid-1990s.  
<Figure 4 around here> 
 
As widespread as the turnaround in fertility has been, the magnitude of increase from 
‘lowest-low’ levels has been often small (Figure 5a). .However, in many countries the 
TFR showed a strong reversal: Spain and nine former communist countries, including 
Russia and Ukraine, experienced a TFR increase of 0.30-0.45; in Eastern Germany the 
TFR increased by 0.63 to 1.40 in 2008 (Table 1). This trend as well as the regional 
analysis above clearly show that there is nothing inevitable about the lowest-low 
fertility and that many countries experiencing spells of extreme low TFR may later 
see a vigorous recovery of period fertility to moderately low fertility levels. 
Interestingly, some of the ‘higher-fertility’ countries, including France, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom, have seen a strong TFR increase of 0.3-0.4, i.e., larger than that 
recorded in most of the ‘ever lowest-low fertility’ countries (Table 1, Figure 5b). As a 
result, considerable regional diversity in fertility levels has not diminished in Europe 
(e.g., Frejka and Sobotka 2008).  
 
<Figures 5a and 5b around here> 
 
                                                 
14 In Shanghai, and plausibly also in other large cities of China, the originally coercive one-child policy 
has become widely internalised and led to the spread of one-child family preferences (see Nie and 
Wyman 2005 for an example of Shanghai). 
  94. The role of tempo effects in explaining the TFR increase 
 
A trend towards later timing of childbearing constitutes the most prominent 
explanation of the TFR decline to very low levels. It negatively affects conventional 
period fertility indicators pushing them well below the eventually achieved completed 
fertility during the whole period when childbearing takes place at progressively later 
ages (e.g., Bongaarts 2002). Such a negative distortion, frequently labeled ‘tempo 
effect’ can last three decades or even longer, as has been the case in many European 
countries and Japan (Sobotka 2004b). Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002) proposed that 
developed countries are undergoing a distinct ‘postponement transition’ from an early 
to a late timing of motherhood. The end of fertility postponement should eventually 
lead to an elimination of the tempo effect and a subsequent increase in the period 
TFR, provided that the underlying fertility level (net of tempo effect) remains stable 
(Bongaarts 2002: 437-8, see also below). Sobotka’s (2004a) analysis suggested that 
all the lowest-low fertility countries of Europe were affected by negative tempo effect 
in the second half of the 1990s and none of them would experience a TFR below 1.4 
without fertility postponement.  
 
We analyze the role that diminishing tempo effect has had in the recent turnaround in 
the period TFR in two ways. First, we estimate Bongaarts and Feeney’s (1998) tempo-
adjusted measures of the period TFR. Second, we estimate the role that the first-birth-
order TFR, which is especially susceptible to tempo effects, has had in the recent 
increase. The Bongaarts-Feeney approach has the advantage of allowing us 
decompose the change in the TFR to quantum and tempo effects. The approach, 
however, requires fairly strong assumptions to be made about the nature of 
postponement, in particular that in a given period, all age groups postpone births by 
exactly the same amount. In practice, the method is trusted the most when its 
estimates are averaged over several years, and as is discussed later on, some caution 
should be used when interpreting short-term variations in the tempo-adjusted TFR. 
The first-birth TFR analysis is less dependent on any particular assumptions, instead 
relying on the fact that when there is postponement, the effect on first births tends to 
be particularly strong. Together the two types of analysis add confidence to inferences 
made about the role of postponement in depressing the levels of period birth rates. 
 
4.1 Changes in tempo-adjusted TFR: did tempo effects decline in importance? 
 
Our investigation of tempo effects is based on our calculations of the tempo-adjusted 
TFR using Bongaarts and Feeney's (1998 and 2000) method (see Appendix 1 for 
details concerning the computation of the tempo-adjusted TFR and the provisional 
nature of recent estimates.)  
 
The tempo-adjusted TFR tries to measure the intensity of fertility that a period would 
have seen if there had been no postponement. As such, it aims to be a pure measure of 
period quantum. One can attribute an increase in the observed TFR to changes in 
tempo if the tempo-adjusted TFR remains flat while the observed TFR rises. On the 
other hand, if the observed and tempo-adjusted TFR rise in unison, then quantum 
changes can be held responsible. 
 
  10The observed TFR and the mean age at childbearing for a range of countries are 
shown in Figure 6, along with our tempo-adjusted estimates of the TFR. Spain is an 
example in which the tempo-adjusted and observed TFR have converged in recent 
years, suggesting that a decline in the tempo effect—driven by the slowdown of 
postponement visible in the mean age of birth—is responsible for the recent increase 
in the TFR. At the other extreme, Bulgaria has seen little slowdown in the rate of 
postponement over the course of the recent fertility increase, and so the tempo-
adjusted TFR rises as fast or faster as the observed TFR.  
 
<Figure 6 around here> 
 
 
The share of TFR increase attributable to quantum and tempo is shown in Figures 7a 
and 7b. In the vast majority of cases there was some increase in fertility due to 
diminishing tempo effect. In some cases, for example, Spain, Romania, and Slovenia, 
slowdowns in postponement appear to have been nearly entirely responsible for recent 
TFR increases. In a few other cases, such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, or Japan, however, 
the estimated effect of tempo changes is actually negative, with apparent increases in 
quantum being responsible for any rise in the TFR. 
 
<Figures 7a and 7b around here> 
 
The analysis of the TFR rise in selected countries that never experienced lowest-low 
fertility shows that declining tempo effects largely contributed to this increase (Figure 
7b). Declining tempo effect had a dominant role in the TFR increase in the United 
States, the Netherlands, Norway and Austria, roughly the same role as quantum 
increase in Sweden and a minor but important role (explaining about 40% of the TFR 
rise) in Denmark and Finland. 
 
Further investigation of trends in the tempo-adjusted TFR provides two key insights. 
First, tempo effect still remained an important force pushing the period TFR in 2006 
downwards by 0.15 (Greece) to 0.44 (the Czech Republic) in all the analyzed 
countries where the TFR has bounced back above the 1.3 threshold, except Spain.
15 
Second, it is surprising that the tempo-adjusted TFR in a majority of analyzed 
countries increased after the year when the lowest TFR was reached. This observation 
was unexpected in that the ‘classic’ argument about the potential increase in the TFR 
level envisioned that the TFR may eventually increase to its adjusted level once the 
tempo distortion stops. Bongaarts (2002: 437, Figure 8b) also offered an illustration of 
an alternative scenario, where the fertility quantum declines over time and reduces 
thus the potential scope for the TFR decline linked to the ending of fertility 
postponement. Thus, the finding that both the TFR and the adjTFR actually increased, 
raising thus the potential scope for a further TFR recovery, gives a new perspective to 
our hypotheses about the future fertility trends.
16  
                                                 
15 The analysed data for 15 countries are shown in Table S3 in Appendix 3. It is likely that the adjusted 
and the observed TFR have also converged in Italy, for which we do not dispose with recent data to 
perform this analysis. In the past three decades, trends in fertility tempo and quantum in Italy and Spain 
were remarkably similar.  
16 An example of Denmark provides a good illustration of this point: in 1983, when the TFR reached a 
low of 1.38, the adjTFR was 1.75. Thus, an analyst expecting that fertility quantum, as measured by the 
adjTFR, would not decline further, might have predicted a recovery in the TFR up to that level. Twenty 
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There are two competing explanations for the observed increases in quantum as 
lowest-low fertility reverses. The first is to take the results of the Bongaarts-Feeney 
tempo-adjusted period fertility rate literally as evidence that the intensity of 
childbearing really did increase over time. This increase in fertility could have 
resulted from a wide range of economic and social changes. Similarly, one might also 
think the quantum measure tells the level to which fertility will return if and when 
postponement comes to an end. In this sense, the increases in quantum are signals of 
higher future fertility, and perhaps even of higher cohort fertility.  
 
The alternative is to take a more skeptical view of the Bongaarts-Feeney measures. 
The interpretation of the tempo-adjusted TFR as a pure quantum measure depends on 
all of the effects of changes in timing being controlled for in the adjustment process. 
Notably, the assumption of uniform postponement across all ages—a complete 
absence of cohort effects—can be important (Kohler and Philipov 2001) Today, a 
likely source of cohort-differentiation can be seen in the extent to which much of the 
recent TFR increases have come from increasing fertility at older ages. A possible 
explanation for the concentration of fertility increase in older ages is that we are 
witnessing the recuperation of births delayed by cohorts when they were younger 
(Lestaeghe and Willems 1999, Lesthaeghe 2001, Frejka and Sardon 2009). When the 
postponement transition is driven by cohorts rather than periods, it is possible to see 
apparent, but misleading, increases in the tempo-adjusted TFR as the postponement 
transition passes its peak. A simple example illustrating this effect is given in 
Appendix 6. 
 
The distinction between period-based and cohort-based postponements may help 
explain some differences in ‘recuperation’ observed by Lesthaeghe and Willems 
(1999). In Northern and Western Europe, the decline in cohort fertility at younger 
ages was offset by subsequent increases in fertility when postponing cohorts aged. In 
Southern Europe, there was less recuperation. One can speculate that the reason for 
this is that in the Northwest, postponement was closer to the cohort-based examples 
given here, with impetus for postponement coming from changes in the female life-
course, particularly increases in schooling and pre-motherhood work experience. In 
Southern Europe, where increases in postponement were partly triggered by high rates 
of unemployment and then eased thereafter, the period-based model might be more 
appropriate. In Eastern Europe, there might also be a combination of period and 
cohort-driven shifts as economic hardship of the 1990s produced period postponement 
but the economic and social transformation of post-communist societies created 
strong cohort effects. At this point, such hypotheses remain speculative, but worthy of 
further investigation. 
                                                                                                                                            
years later, in 2003, the actual TFR did indeed reach this level (1.76), but in the meantime, the tempo-
adjusted TFR increased to 2.0, signaling a hypothetical scope for further increase in the TFR. However, 
some portion of the apparent quantum increase as measured by the adjTFR might be attributable to the 
fluctuations that are inherent in this indicator and that may reflect a violation of its underlying 
assumptions. 
  124.2 Transition in first-birth TFR and its contribution to the overall TFR increase 
 
At the time when the period TFR reached the lowest level, its first-order component 
typically fell to 0.6 or even lower (Table S4 in Appendix 4). Nowhere are the 
distortions in the period TFR and the problems of interpreting such an erratic indicator 
more clearly visible than in its first-order component (Ryder 1990: 440). If taken at a 
face value, such low TFR1, especially when prevailing over longer periods of time 
would imply childlessness exceeding 40%. Such levels contrast with the actual 
childlessness in Europe and East Asia. Various analyzes and projections indicate that 
only few of the lowest-low fertility countries are likely to experience childlessness 
higher than 20% among the late 1960s and the early 1970s cohorts (Sobotka 2005; 
Frejka and Sardon 2006, Sardon 2006) and only in Germany and Japan childlessness 
may eventually rise to very high levels of 25-30% (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2007, 
Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 2007, Iwasawa and Kaneko 2007). Clearly, first-order TFR 
in lowest-low fertility countries became strongly depressed by fertility postponement 
in the 1990s and declined well below any plausible levels of cohort first birth rates. 
This finding suggests that some increase in the period TFR would be expected solely 
because of a transitory depression and parity-composition distortions in first-order 
TFR (see also Sobotka and Lutz 2009)
17 We propose that the lowest-low TFR has its 
analogy in its first-order component, where the values below 0.75 can be labeled as 
lowest-low first birth levels.  
 
All the ‘lowest-low fertility’ countries with available data recorded the lowest-low 
TFR1 at the time of reaching the lowest TFR level. As of 2007, the first-order TFR 
increased in all of these countries, but only in four of them—Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Russia, and Spain—did the TFR1 rise above 0.75. This signals that in most countries 
the first-order component of the period TFR was still negatively affected by tempo 
and parity composition effects, suggesting a further scope for its rise. In line with our 
expectations the increase in the first-order TFR was typically more rapid than the 
overall rise in the TFR for second and higher order births, both in absolute and 
relative terms (see Appendix 4 for more details). 
 
Because first birth rates are usually more affected by childbearing postponement than 
higher-order birth rates, we propose that the TFR1 follows in most lowest-low fertility 
countries a distinct trajectory during this process that broadly conforms to the 
postponement transition framework of Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002). First, 
countries start with relatively high TFR1 and an early mean age at first birth. When 
postponement kicks in, TFR1 falls, often to the lowest-low levels below 0.75 and the 
mean age at first birth begins its long-term rise. Once this ‘transition’ comes to the 
end, the mean age at first birth tends to stabilize at a high level (typically, at age 28 or 
older) and the TFR1 bounces back, although usually not as high as it was at the start 
of the process (allowing for some decline in fertility levels). Most of the ‘ever lowest-
                                                 
17 Parity composition distortions in the TFR are attributable to changes in the parity composition of 
women of childbearing ages. During the course of fertility postponement number of childless women at 
younger (and later also at older) reproductive ages rises rapidly, affecting the order-specific TFR which 
does not control for parity distribution. In contrast, parity-specific fertility indicators such as the 
PATFR index (Rallu and Toulemon 1994) are affected only by tempo distortions, but not by the parity 
composition effect. 
  13low’ fertility countries now appear to be approaching this final stage. We provide a 
description and a graphical illustration of this process in Supplementary Appendix 4. 
 
Having described the fertility increase in detail, we now turn to explanations for 
increasing fertility, including a changing composition of the population due to 
immigration, economic change, and policy change. 
 
5. The contribution of immigrant women to rising total fertility rates 
 
More affluent parts of Europe have experienced substantial immigration, especially in 
2001-2008 when the European Union experienced net migration between 1.3 and 1.9 
million annually, representing a net annual population gain of 0.3-0.4% (Eurostat 
2006, 2008b, and 2009b). Since immigrant women in most European countries have 
on average higher fertility rates than the native ones (Sobotka 2008a, Coleman 2006, 
Haug et al. 2002), it is possible that fertility rates in many European countries have 
been pushed upwards by a compositional effect of the rising share of higher-fertility 
immigrants. Although data on immigrants’ fertility remain relatively scarce in Europe, 
several contributions have discussed this possibility in the case of England and Wales, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (Héran and Pison 2007, Gabrielli et al. 2007, 
ONS 2008, Sobotka 2008a). In fact, the argument on immigrants’ fertility is relevant 
only for a small set of lowest-low fertility countries in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, 
and Spain) as other countries with such low fertility either experienced very limited 
immigration (Eastern Asia, south-eastern Europe, Eastern Europe except Russia and 
some countries of Central Europe), or a large-scale immigration is very recent there 
(the Czech Republic and Slovenia) or no reliable data on immigrants’ fertility are 
available (Russia). Therefore we look at the evidence for three Southern European 
countries and then briefly summarize the findings for several higher-fertility countries 
of Western and Northern Europe with good-quality data on migrants’ fertility.  
 
All the larger countries in Southern Europe collect data on births to foreign mothers, 
which exclude immigrant women that have received nationality of their country of 
residence. However, because mass immigration to Southern Europe is relatively 
recent, occurring mostly after the mid-1990s, most immigrants still retain the 
citizenship of their country of origin and data on foreign women thus give a good 
picture of immigrants’ fertility. Only Spanish Statistical Office (INE) provides 
detailed birth and population data for foreign women covering most of the period of 
the rising TFR, starting in 1998. Spanish data are particularly interesting, since Spain 
experienced the largest migration gain in Europe in the period 2000-2008, with 
estimated net migration of 5.1 million (Eurostat 2009b).
18 Using the most recent data 
for Greece, Italy and Spain Table 2 compares the shares of births to foreign mothers 
and the TFR for foreign, native and all women in 2005-2007. A relatively large 
fraction of births, 15-17%, was attributable to foreign women, a huge increase from 
fewer than 5% in Italy and Spain in 1998. More important for our analysis, the TFR of 
native women remained slightly below the lowest-low threshold in Greece and Italy 
and it has hit the 1.3 threshold in Spain. Therefore, without the contribution of foreign 
women, Greece and Italy would still record the lowest-low TFR in 2005 and 2007, 
                                                 
18 Italian statistical office publishes age structure of foreign residents only since 2004 and Greek 
statistical office collects vital statistics data by citizenship only since 2005 (Tsimbos 2008). 
  14respectively, and the relatively high TFR of foreigners helped to push their TFR just 
above the lowest-low threshold. At the same time, its absolute boost to the TFR was 
rather modest, between 0.05 (Spain) and 0.09 (Greece and Italy).  
 
<Table 2 around here> 
 
This analysis does not reveal, however, whether immigrant women had a decisive 
influence on the TFR rise from the lowest recorded levels. We can provide such 
analysis only for Spain, comparing the TFR for foreign, native and all women in 
1998, 2002, and 2006.
19 In 1998, Spanish TFR was at the lowest recorded level of 
1.16, recovering subsequently to 1.46 in 2007 (Figure 6 and Table 1 above). Spanish 
TFR increase between 1998 and 2006 was by and large driven by the rise in fertility 
rates among native women, whose TFR rose by 0.17 (after rounding), just below the 
overall TFR rise of 0.20. The net impact of foreign women on the TFR in Spain rose 
only slightly and contributed a very modest 16% to the TFR increase after 1998. This 
surprisingly small contribution resulted from a rapid fall in foreign-women TFR, from 
2.4 in 1998 to 1.7 in 2006. Provided that the data on foreign population can be 
trusted
20, such a fall in migrants’ fertility could be attributed either to the change in 
the composition of the foreign population (more recent immigrants coming from 
lower-fertility countries, especially from Eastern and South-eastern Europe) or to the 
decline in migrants’ fertility with their longer duration of stay, observed in many other 
countries (e.g., Toulemon 2004, Andersson 2004). If foreign women retained their 
level of age-specific fertility in 1998, Spanish TFR would increase to 1.44 in 2006 
and the contribution of foreign women would be considerably stronger, although still 
not dominant (Table 3).
21  
 
<Table 3 around here> 
 
In contrast to Spain, migrant women had a much more important role in pushing the 
Italian TFR upwards. According to the estimates by Gabrielli et al. 2007, a 
combination of their increasing fertility and an increasing share in the population 
between 1996 (when the TFR was close to its lowest point) and 2004 contributed 
about two-thirds of the Italian TFR rise of 0.11 in that period. This finding 
corresponds well with the high TFR level recorded among foreign women in Italy in 
2007 (Table 2). Also in many Italian and Spanish regions that once experienced 
extreme low fertility levels, immigrants helped to push fertility close to or above the 
lowest-low levels.
22  
                                                 
19 For detailed and very informative analysis of fertility of immigrants in Spain see Roig Vila and 
Castro Martín 2007. 
20 Gabrielli et al. (2007: Fn 12) discuss the possibility that there may be a mismatch in Spain between 
birth registration system and municipal registration system of foreign population, especially with 
respect to illegal and unregistered migrants. Such a mismatch can lead to erroneous estimates of 
fertility trends and levels among foreign women. 
21 Even with their more modest contribution, foreign women have an appreciable influence on age-
specific pattern of Spanish fertility. Their young childbearing schedule, peaking at age 22, strongly 
contrasts with the schedule of Spanish women that peaks at age 32 and pushes fertility rates in Spain 
markedly upwards at ages 18-27 (more detailed analysis available from T. Sobotka upon request).  
22 In the case of the Italian province of Emilia-Romagna, discussed above, native women have 
contributed most to the recovery of the TFR from the low of 0.94 in 1987, but it was the contribution of 
immigrants that helped to push the TFR well above the lowest-low threshold: While native Italian 
  15 
The evidence for some other countries in Europe that are comfortably above the 
lowest-low fertility threshold and that have relatively good statistics on migrant 
fertility indicates that Italian case is not very typical and that more countries conform 
to the Spanish case. An analysis of the recent increase in the TFR in England and 
Wales, Denmark, France, and Sweden shows that it was mostly or fully fuelled by a 
rise in native women’s fertility, whereas immigrants have contributed by less than one 
third to this increase (but only 5% in Sweden and negatively in Denmark, Table 4).  
 
<Table 4 around here> 
 
6. The role of improving economic conditions on the end of lowest-
low fertility 
 
In the past two decades, the lowest fertility levels have often been accompanied by 
challenging economic conditions. In difficult times, couples appeared to postpone the 
birth of a next child or stop having children altogether as a way of economizing. In 
this section, we look at whether the reversal of lowest-low fertility may have come as 
a result of improving economic conditions. In a number of countries, this appears to 
have been the case. Interestingly, period TFR in diverse countries like Japan, Poland, 
and Spain began to rise at about the same time or soon after unemployment began to 
fall (see Figure S2 in Appendix 5). 
 
Economic conditions can be measured using a variety of indicators. In our analysis, 
we use unemployment as an easily available general indicator.
23 Figure 8 shows that 
bivariate relationship between fertility and unemployment in the nine OECD countries 
that currently have or have in the past had lowest-low fertility. The unemployment is 
lagged by one year, so that economic conditions in year t are compared with births in 
year t+1. We see that higher unemployment is associated with lower fertility in eight 
of the nine countries considered, with Hungary being the exception. In some cases—
Italy, Spain, Greece, and Japan—the relationship is extraordinarily linear. In the 
Czech Republic, the unemployment rate does not appear to be a good predictor of the 
fertility rate, whereas in Hungary the relationship runs in the opposite direction than 
expected (i.e., higher unemployment is associated with higher fertility). 
 
<Figure 8 around here> 
 
The median effect of a change in the logarithm of the unemployment on the total 
fertility rate in these countries is -0.23. This means a halving of unemployment is 
associated with an increase of the TFR of about log(1/2)*(-0.23) = 0.16. This estimate 
is larger than in the literature (Kravdal 2002, Adserà 2004, Ermisch 1990, and other), 
because unemployment serves as a proxy for a larger set of variables measuring 
                                                                                                                                            
women living in this province recorded a TFR 1.27 in 2007, fertility of foreign women had a net 
positive effect of 0.18 on the overall TFR that reached 1.45 (ISTAT 2009c, Table 2.9).  
23 This analysis also conforms to the importance of unemployment for depressing fertility rates, 
stressed by Adserà (2004 and 2005, see Section 2). Using GDP growth as a measure of general 
economic conditions produces similar results. 
  16economic conditions and also perhaps because the influence of economic conditions 
may be larger for very low fertility countries or has become larger in recent years. 
 
Using this estimate of the effect of unemployment on fertility, we can try to answer 
how much of the increase in fertility in recent years might be due to improving 
economic conditions. We do this by predicting the increase in TFR that would have 
occurred solely as a function of improving unemployment. Taking Spain as an 
example, the lowest level of the TFR was 1.16 in 1996. By 2007, the TFR rose to 
1.39, an increase of 0.23. Over this same period, unemployment fell from 22.1% to 
8.3%. The predicted change in the TFR is thus log(8.3/22.1)*(-.23) = +0.23. So in the 
case of Spain, the increase in fertility happens to be exactly what one would have 
expected from improving economic conditions. 
 
The extent to which improving economic conditions have predicted the turn-around in 
lowest-low fertility can be seen in Figure 9, ordered so that the countries where 
economic conditions ‘explain’ the largest share of the increase are farthest to the left. 
We can see in Slovakia, Poland, Spain, and Italy, economic conditions predict fully 
the turn-around in period TFR. In Japan, Greece and Korea, improving economic 
conditions provide a partial explanation, accounting for a minor portion of recent 
fertility increase. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, economic conditions—at least 
as measured by the unemployment rate—provide no explanation of fertility increase.  
 
<Figure 9 around here> 
 
6.1 The current crisis 
 
The analysis of the role of economic conditions is useful not only for understanding 
the past fall and rise of lowest-low fertility, but also for predicting the future. The 
current world-wide economic crisis has brought rapid increase in unemployment and 
job insecurity and in many countries also declining income and huge turbulences on 
the housing market, a situation which in the past generally correlated with declining 
period fertility. The OECD (2009: 61) has estimated that unemployment will increase 
in the OECD area from 5.6% in 2007 to 9.9% in 2010. This increase would—using 
the same estimate as above—produce a decline in the TFR of about 0.13. We can also 
make such estimates on a country-by-country basis, using country-specific forecasts 
of unemployment along with a common estimate the effect of unemployment on 
fertility. This approach predicts that at least four countries, Hungary, Italy, Japan, and 
Spain, would all fall back below the threshold of lowest-low fertility, while Slovakia 
would fall yet deeper below the threshold.  
 
Such calculations are clearly speculative. There is great uncertainty both in the 
forecast of future unemployment and in the effect of its change on fertility in 
individual countries. This effect will be modified by country-specific institutional 
factors and, in some cases when parental leave policies or welfare support is generous, 
the period of economic downturn may actually stimulate more women to take an 
‘advantage’ of temporary non-employment and have children. Such an unexpected 
reaction to economic recession was observed in Finland in the early 1990s (Vikat 
2004). Still, if we accept the magnitudes of these two estimates, it would seem 
reasonable to expect yet another, although temporary, reversal of fertility trends in a 
  17number of formerly lowest-low fertility countries, producing an increase in the 
number of countries that fall again below this arbitrary threshold. 
 
The above analysis has been premised on a very simple relationship between 
economic conditions and the level of fertility. Such a simple relationship may help to 
explain short-term fluctuations in fertility, but would clearly be less successful in the 
longer term. More complicated formulations are needed to understand the role of 
economic conditions when combined with social influence and value changes (Kohler 
et al. 2002, Billari 2008). Another factor that probably matters is the potential for 
further tempo effects, which should depend on how much postponement has already 
occurred. Goldstein (2006) argues that current populations are still far from the upper 
age limits of fertility. Most of the lowest-low fertility populations still have room for 
continued postponements, but how much remains an open question. Some of them, 
namely Italy, Japan, and Spain, are already among the oldest-childbearing populations 
of the world.  
 
 
7. Is there any merit of policy in the upturns of fertility? 
 
The effect of family policies on fertility remains an unsettled issue; different studies 
come up with contradictory conclusions on policy effectiveness and the magnitude of 
its impact (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997, Hantrais 1997, Gauthier 2000, 2002, 2007, 
Neyer 2003, Castles 2003). The assessment of the influences of family-related 
policies is methodologically challenging. Their impact on fertility depends on “the 
type of policies, the levels of benefits, the conditions of eligibility, and the income and 
opportunity sets of individuals, as well as the norms, stigma, and sanctions associated 
with the receipt of benefits” (Gauthier 2007: 324). Gauthier’s (2007) analysis of 
policy effects on fertility in industrialized countries concludes that public policies 
frequently influence fertility, but their impact is usually small. Policies influence 
especially the timing of childbearing rather than the completed family size and their 
effects are frequently short-lived. 
 
We do not aim to assess quantitatively the effects of specific policies on the upturns of 
fertility observed in the lowest-low fertility countries. Instead, by way of examples for 
several lowest-low fertility countries we explore the stand of governments towards 
low fertility, discuss new policy initiatives that have taken place in these countries, 
and hypothesize whether they could have played a part in the fertility reversals. 
 
Low fertility has increasingly become a matter of policy concern for the governments 
of many developed countries as well as for the whole EU (European Commission 
2005). Judging from the policy monitoring reports published by the United Nations, 
the governments of all the countries that experienced lowest-low fertility have 
eventually embraced the view that fertility in their country is too low and declared 
that policies should aim to raise its level. By 2007 this was the case in all the 22 
lowest-low fertility countries that are listed in the UN publications—almost twice as 
many as in 1996 or 2000 (Figure 10). Such a unanimous consensus across a broad 
group of countries is striking, and it indicates a wide acceptance of pronatalism in 
both East Asia and Europe. If we broaden our analysis and include countries ever 
reaching the TFR below 1.4 (see Table 1), only two of these countries, Cuba and 
  18Denmark, declared in 2007 that their fertility is satisfactory and embraced the ‘no 
intervention’ policies and, in addition, Switzerland did not have a policy aim to raise 
its fertility. There appears to be some time gap, however, with which some 
governments react to very low fertility. In several countries, including Spain, 
pronatalist views were embraced only at the time when the TFR actually bounced 
back above the lowest-low level. 
 
<Figure 10 around here> 
 
The newly introduced measures aimed at stimulating higher fertility range from baby 
bonuses, family allowances, maternal and paternal leave up to subsidized child care, 
tax incentives, subsidized housing, and flexible work schedules. Our examples below 
look first at five lowest-low fertility countries of Europe—Spain and three former 
state-socialist countries, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia—and then at two Asian 
societies, Japan and Singapore.  
 
 
7.1 Examples of recent policy initiatives in the lowest-low fertility countries 
 
In order to encourage families to have more children, Spain launched a financial 
incentive scheme in 2007, when the parents of each newborn or adopted child 
became eligible to a bonus of 2,500 Euros. There was no obvious immediate effect 
on fertility trends and the TFR increased only slightly in 2007 (by 1%), broadly in 
line with an upward trend established since 1999. Plausibly, the larger TFR increase 
in 2008 (by 5%), double the rate of increase in Greece, Italy and Portugal, might be 
partly explained by this new incentive. Although work and family reconciliation 
policies have received increasing attention in Spain in recent years, important 
obstacles that make young people postpone family formation (high childcare-related 
costs, expensive housing, high youth unemployment (Simó Noguera et al. 2005, 
Delgado et al. 2008)) remain unresolved.  
 
Baby bonuses of similar type as in Spain were also introduced in Australia, Singapore, 
and Russia, and it seems that they had some—although probably temporary—effect. 
For example, in Australia a baby bonus ($3,000) was introduced in 2004 and an 
upturn in fertility rates was observed thereafter: the TFR increased from 1.75 to 1.93 
between 2003 and 2007 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008). However, the largest 
rise in the TFR took place only in 2007 and the baby bonus probably played a minor 
role in this increase, since “it was only one element of a package of other measures 
whose generosity has also increased substantially” (Lattimore and Pobke 2008).  
 
Estonia experienced one of the largest TFR increases among the analyzed countries, 
from 1.28 to 1.66 between 1998 and 2008. It is plausible that newly adopted policies 
contributed to this rise in fertility. Estonia repeatedly modified its family benefits 
schemes in terms of their levels and eligibility criteria. An important turn in Estonian 
family policy took place in 2004 when the parental benefit compensating for the 
income lost by the parent staying at home with children (sometimes called “mother’s 
  19salary”) was introduced.
24 It was a great improvement for the parents compared to 
the previous small flat-rate benefit. There was a concurrent noticeable rise in the TFR 
observed in 2004 (by 0.09 as compared to 2003), which took place at all birth orders, 
and the upward trend persisted into later years as well (see Figure 6).  
 
In the Czech Republic, a shift in the development of family policy occurred with the 
coming of the new government after the 1998 election, which placed a stronger focus 
on family issues. It was the time when the TFR dropped to its all-time low of 1.13. 
Since then the promotion of family-friendly policies started playing a significant role 
in the political competition for votes of the electorate. In 2005, shortly before the 
parliamentary elections, the parliament agreed to double the birth allowance as well as 
the parental leave benefit. Apart from these changes, in 1995 the paid parental leave 
was extended until the child reaches four years of age (Sobotka et al. 2008). However, 
no clear relationship between family policies and fertility swings can be established: 
the TFR in the Czech Republic started rising steadily after 2003, i.e., before the more 
generous system of birth allowances and parental leave benefits came into effect in 
2007. 
 
Russia has a rather long history of pronatalist policy measures. A most comprehensive 
package, broadening childcare opportunities for working mothers, was introduced in 
the early 1980s (see Zakharov 2006 and 2008). These policies had a strong, but 
temporary effect on period fertility (Avdeev and Monnier 1995, Zakharov 2006 and 
2008). No major changes in family policy were implemented until 2007 when in 
response to President Putin’s urgent demand to counteract the fertility decline a new 
package of policies was prepared. The implemented changes involved significant 
increases in the levels of various types of benefits as well as the introduction of so-
called ‘maternal capital’. The ‘maternal capital’ is transferred to women who have 
given birth to (or adopted) a second child as well as to women who have a third or 
higher-order child and who have never received this payment before.
25 The very 
preliminary reading of the data for 2007 suggests that the new policies have 
accelerated the ongoing shift towards later childbearing and their main effect was on 
the second and higher-order birth rates among women at older childbearing ages (see 
also Zakharov 2008a). The TFR, which was on a slowly rising trajectory before 2007, 
jumped from 1.30 to 1.51 between 2006 and 2008. However, at least part of this rise 
may be attributable to the effects of (by then) positive economic situation, as the TFR 
in the same period rose rapidly also in the neighboring Belarus and Ukraine that did 
not implement so vigorous pronatalist measures.  
 
To reverse the decline in fertility rates, Japan enacted numerous pronatalist policies 
and programs supporting childcare and parental leave starting from the early 1990s 
(e.g., Ogawa 2003). Through introducing parental leave, expanding childcare services 
and similar measures, the government aimed to facilitate childbearing among working 
married women (Retherford and Ogawa 2006). As a result, Japan improved its 
international ranking in family policies, especially with respect to childcare 
                                                 
24 The parental benefit amounts to 100% of previous salary, it is subject to income tax and is paid for a 
455-day period, starting after the end of maternity leave (UNICEF 2006). 
25 The so-called ‘maternal capital’ is equal to 250,000 roubles (5,560 Euros as of March 2009). It is 
paid once in mother’s lifetime, and she can start making use of the money three years after the 
childbirth. It can be spent for a limited range of purposes, which include paying for children’s 
education, purchasing housing, investing for retirement and the like (Zakharov 2008). 
  20expenditures (Boling 2008). Nevertheless, for quite a while, Japan along with 
Singapore has been referred to as an example of the policy failure (McDonald 2006). 
Among the usually noted reasons are inconsistencies in the family support scheme, 
the failure to target all women irrespective of their income and education, and to 
achieve higher family-friendliness in workplaces.  
 
Singapore started introducing openly pronatalist policies in the 1980s. The objective 
of these policies was not only to raise fertility, but also to reduce fertility 
differentiation by education. The government was concerned about too low fertility 
among highly educated women and much higher fertility among those with low 
education. Incentives were introduced to encourage better-educated women to have at 
least three children and, at the same time, to discourage low-income and low-educated 
women to have larger families through sterilization bonuses (Yap 2002). This 
selectively pronatalist approach did not work well; there was a small effect on fertility 
only shortly after the introduction of new policies. In addition, the government 
launched baby bonuses for the second and third child, but these incentives do not 
really seem to give any appreciable results so far. 
 
Much more research is needed to examine all aspects of newly introduced policies and 
to disentangle the policy effects from other determinants of fertility. Our tentative 
findings suggest that (i) there are instances where policies seem to be plausibly related 
to the rise in fertility (Estonia and also Russia as far as the launch of ‘maternal capital’ 
in 2007 is concerned), (ii) there were fertility rises where there were no major policy 
changes (Spain before the introduction of the baby bonus in 2007, Russia in 2000-
2004), (iii) there were policies that came after the rise in fertility started and thus have 
no obvious role in facilitating it (the Czech Republic), and (iv) there were policies 
which do not seem to have had any palpable influence on fertility (Singapore, Japan, 
at least until recent years). Similarly contrasting evidence pertains to the ‘higher-
fertility’ developed countries. At least in some of them, including Australia and the 




Policy change and economic change both follow a time path. For policy, a problem is 
discovered, reactions to it are considered, and some time passes by the time that any 
new policies are in place, let alone influence behavior. For economics, each downturn 
is—so far—eventually followed by an upturn. The postponement of fertility also 
appears to have a rhythm; the pace of postponement starts slowly, accelerates, and 
then decelerates as a new equilibrium is reached. An obstacle to making inferences 
about the effect of economic and policy change is that the timing of these changes 
may coincide with the progression of the tempo transition. In this final section, we 
consider the postponement transition itself.  
 
8. Modeling postponement transitions 
 
The idea of a postponement transition from young to older ages of childbearing 
emphasizes the role of social interaction effects on fertility behavior (Kohler, Billari 
                                                 
26 Since 1997 the UK government has launched initiatives aimed at improving childcare availability, 
maternity leave, and increasing welfare support to families with children (Sigle-Rushton 2008). 
  21and Ortega 2002, Bratti and Tatsiramos 2008). According to the theory, individuals do 
not only optimize their own behavior in isolation, but rather receive utility by doing 
what is socially normative. In other words, the desirability of actions is linked to how 
close they are to those of others. Applying this theory to fertility timing is appealing 
both because age-norms about when it is appropriate to have children are known to be 
powerful and because the appeal of childbearing or remaining childless may depend 
on what one’s peers are doing. 
 
Here we further develop the idea of a postponement transition. Taking the logistic 
model as the parametric form of the transition, we estimate the pace of postponement 
transitions based on data for the lowest-low fertility countries through 2007. This 
helps us to understand why postponement can occur over many decades, but lowest-
low fertility usually last only about 10 years. We also briefly address the issue of 
whether fertility postponement is primarily a ‘period’ or ‘cohort’ driven process and 
point out that a cohort-driven postponement may explain some of the apparent 
increase in fertility quantum associated with the end of lowest-low-fertility.  
 
8.1 How long does lowest low fertility last? 
 
We can use the combined experience of populations with lowest-low fertility to obtain 
a generalized and stylized description of the ‘postponement transition.’ Figure 11 
shows the relationship between the rate of postponement of first births and the mean 
age at first birth. The inverted U-shape means that postponement is slowest when first 
births occur quite early or quite late and fastest when ages of first birth are 
intermediate. The typical trajectory of a postponement transition can be obtained by 
fitting a line to the scatter plot. In the case of Figure 11, we fit a quadratic curve.
27 
The ages at which the curve crosses zero can be thought of as corresponding to the 
equilibrium of early and late childbearing. 
 
<Figure 11 around here> 
 
The estimate of the typical relationship between age at first birth and postponement 
also permits us to estimate the intensity of the postponement transition with respect to 
calendar time. The coefficients of the quadratic curve shown in the figure provide 
constants for a logistic differential equation.
28 Solving this differential equation 
transforms the relationship between mean age and pace of postponement into 
statements about how the mean age and pace of postponement vary over time. The 
                                                 
27 The line shown here is for the pooled sample, but adding separate effects for each country produces 
nearly the same result. 
28 The solution to this quadratic differential equation is the S-shaped logistic growth curve. Writing our 
differential equation as   , and letting  c bm am m + + = ′
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  22next two panels of the figure show this relationship: first, the S-shaped transition from 
low to high ages at first birth, and second, the rise and fall in the pace of 
postponement.  
 
We can now characterize the duration of the postponement transition. If we mark the 
beginning of the postponement transition at the time when the increase in the mean 
age at first birth surpassed one tenth of a year per calendar year, and the end of the 
transition similarly, we can see that the entire transition lasts on the order of three to 
four decades. This is in line with the view of a long transition by Kohler, Billari, and 
Ortega (2002) or Goldstein (2006). Importantly, however, the rise and the fall in the 
pace of postponement means that the duration of high levels of postponement—say 
above 0.2 years of age per year of time—will be only a fraction of the entire 
transition. When cohort fertility is averaging 1.6, then rates of postponement above 
0.2 are needed in order to drive observed period fertility to lowest-low levels below 
1.3. In the case of the typical transition, such high levels of postponement are seen 
only for 16 years. This corresponds well with the observed duration of lowest-low 
fertility levels, which are typically on the order of 10 years. An important observation 
is that the end-of-lowest low fertility does not mark the end of the postponement 
transition. During the two decades following the end of lowest-low fertility the period 
TFR rises by another 0.3 in our model example.  
 
Our model, as stylized as it is, allows us to distill what seem to be the essential 
features of the tempo transition. First, a shift from a low to high equilibrium level of 
the timing of first birth. Second, an acceleration and deceleration of postponement 
over the course of the transition. And third, a relatively short period of postponement 
that is rapid enough to create lowest-low fertility in many low-fertility countries. We 
have only focused on first births and described the typical case here, from which the 
experience of individual populations can vary.
29  
 
More work needs to be done in order to give us the ability to distinguish empirically 
between cohort and period shifts in timing. Most probably, there is a combination of 
period and cohort postponement. The result, we argue, can be a misinterpretation of 
the ups and downs in fertility levels in the Bongaarts-Feeney model over the course of 
the postponement transition (see also Schoen 2004). Our preliminary work, discussed 
in Supplementary Appendix 6, is supportive of Kohler and Philipov's (2001) earlier 
results that differential period postponement by age can have a potentially large 







We asked at the beginning of this paper if the era of lowest-low fertility has ended. 
Our answer, to sum up, is “yes”: it appears that the widespread decline in period 
                                                 
29 An area for future research is to study this variation across populations and regions in the pace of 
postponement and in equilibrium timing of birth. This will be possible when more countries have gone 
through the entire transition. 
30 Our findings differ from those of Yi and Land (2001), who found that the Bongaarts-Feeney method 
was quite robust to violations of the constant-shape assumption. See Kohler and Philipov (2001) for a 
discussion. 
  23fertility to extreme low levels that began in many parts of Europe and in East Asia in 
the early 1990s is nearly over, at least in Europe. The clear message coming from our 
analysis confirms what Morgan (2003: 599) proposed in his PAA presidential address: 
“lowest-low fertility is not our inevitable destination and demise.” In Europe, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, there was only one lowest-low fertility country left—Moldova—
as of 2008.
31 In Eastern Asia, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan still recorded fertility 
rates below 1.2 in 2008, but Japan’s TFR has risen above the 1.3 threshold. Many 
parts of China, most of them well above the size of an average European country, 
probably retain sustained lowest-low fertility, but reliable data are unavailable and 
lowest-low fertility there is largely ‘dictated’ by strict government policies promoting 
one-child families. The increases in fertility between the year when the TFR dropped 
to the lowest point and 2008 have ranged from slight to substantial (0.63 in East 
Germany, 0.35-0.45 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Russia, and 
Ukraine). The average fertility in formerly lowest-low countries is now slightly above 
1.4. This is still a very low fertility level, however, and it suggests neither an end of 
sub-replacement fertility across most of the developed world nor a disappearance of 
considerable regional variation in low fertility. If anything, the cross-country 
differences have actually broadened as many of the ‘higher-fertility’ developed 
countries have also seen substantial increases in the period TFR since the late 1990s. 
This is a new and rather unexpected situation; for the first time since the baby-boom 
period of the 1960s there has been a parallel increase in the period TFR across the 
whole developed world. A few industrialized countries, including the United States, 
achieved the TFR levels around the replacement threshold, last recorded in the 1970s. 
This evidence even lays some ground for an upbeat interpretation of the future fertility 
in the most developed countries: Myrskylä et al. (2009) proposed that in these 
countries further development may stimulate a modest increase in their fertility. 
 
For most of the formerly lowest-low countries, the era of sub-1.30 TFR is behind 
them because the ‘postponement transition’ has begun to run its course and, for the 
time being, the fear of an accelerated downward spiral of fertility seems 
unsubstantiated. In many former communist countries of Eastern Europe, especially 
those of the former Soviet Union, a rapid fall and a subsequent steady increase in the 
TFR could also be associated with the effects of the serious economic and social 
crises of the 1990s and their later partial recovery from these crises. Postponement 
still continues in almost all developed countries but at a decelerating pace. The 
importance of tempo effect for explaining lowest-low fertility, illustrated also by 
exceptionally low levels of first-order total fertility, has three important implications. 
First, an extended re-emergence of lowest-low fertility is likely to require a new 
acceleration, not just a continuation, of postponement. Second, lowest-low fertility 
countries still have room for fertility to increase as postponement continues to slow 
and eventually, some day, to stop. Completed cohort fertility rates of younger women 
in lowest-low countries will not be known for some time, but the fertility of cohorts 
born about 1970 tends to be above 1.5 children per women in nearly every case. We 
expect nearly all lowest-low countries to have completed cohort fertility rates in the 
1.5 to 1.8 range. Third, although lowest-low fertility countries have many features 
                                                 
31 Moldova has experienced massive emigration in the last 15 years and it is estimated that up to one 
quarter of its population has lived, at least temporarily, abroad (IOM (2008) cites an estimate of the 
number of emigrants of 16.% for 2005). Therefore, the official fertility data should be taken with 
caution. It is well possible that Moldova’s lowest-low fertility is an artefact of computing fertility rates 
on the basis of ‘inflated’ population data which do not properly account for emigration. 
  24contributing to their low fertility, distinguishing them from their neighbors that never 
recorded such low total fertility rates, none of them would had experienced longer 
spells of lowest-low fertility without a decisive downward push provided by tempo 
effects. 
 
The period of lowest-low fertility typically lasted less than a dozen years. The rather 
short-lived nature of lowest-low fertility is consistent with what we would expect 
from a ‘postponement transition’ from early to late childbearing, and the 
accompanying depression in period fertility that comes from tempo effects. Moreover, 
the postponement transition appears to consist of an acceleration and deceleration of 
postponement over its course. Judging from cross-national observations, the amount 
of time that a population with cohort fertility of 1.6 would have a period TFR less 
than 1.3 is between one and two decades. Although postponement can last for three or 
four decades, perhaps even five, the period of rapid postponement is much shorter.  
 
What would it take for fertility rates to fall once again? With the world experiencing a 
wide-spread economic crisis, birth rates could fall again in many of the formerly 
lowest-low fertility countries. For countries that are still close to the threshold of the 
TFR of 1.3, this could mean another fall below this level. We expect, however, this 
fall in fertility, if it occurs, to be temporary, lasting as long as the crisis permits but 
not inducing the resurgence of long-term fertility postponement in the form of a 
‘second postponement transition’. Indeed, since the end of lowest-low fertility 
corresponds not to an end in postponement but rather to a reduction in the pace of 
postponement, almost all of the formerly lowest-low countries continue to have 
tempo-adjusted fertility rates that are higher than observed fertility. Unless these are 
due to artifacts in the measurement of tempo-adjusted fertility, there is still plenty of 
room for fertility to rise in of these countries even after they cross the 1.30 TFR line.  
 
We saw that economic conditions, as captured by declining unemployment rates, 
correlated with an end of lowest-low fertility. Pronatalist policy perhaps has played a 
role in some cases of recent TFR recovery as well, although its influence cannot be 
easily quantified. A clear result of lowest-low fertility is a change in the attitude of 
governments, with an almost universal concern that national fertility was ‘too low’ 
emerging among lowest-low countries. In some countries, recent fertility increase is 
plausibly linked to specific government policies, while in others the turnaround in 
fertility occurred only after repeated and rather fruitless rounds of pronatalist benefits 
and urgings.  
 
The role of migration—highlighted by Billari (2008) in the case of Italy—was to us a 
plausible factor in the increase of fertility in Greece, Italy, and Spain. However, our 
analysis suggests that although migration played the expected effect of increasing 
fertility in these countries, this effect was not large, although it helped to push Greek 
and Italian TFR slightly above the lowest-low threshold around 2005. In Spain, the 
one country where we were able to look at trends in the fertility of the native-born, we 
saw that fertility was also increasing among the native born. Migration of higher-
fertility migrants was clearly not a universal factor in the end of lowest-low fertility, 
as made clear from the many Eastern European and East Asian countries with 
negligible migration. Even in the Mediterranean countries, the end of lowest-low 
fertility looks as if it would have eventually occurred even among the native 
  25population, but migrants can help sustaining higher fertility there and in other parts of 
Europe in the coming decades 
 
Our brief analyses of the TFR rise in the ‘higher-fertility’ developed countries shows 
broad similarities with the group of ‘lowest-low fertility’ countries in the underlying 
factors of increasing fertility. In all the ‘higher-fertility’ countries that we analyzed, 
disappearing tempo effects were a major factor in the increase of the TFR.. In some—
but not all—of them, other of our analyzed explanations are important as well. 
Obviously, the rise in fertility all over the Europe, in Eastern Asia, in North America 
as well as in Australia and New Zealand resulted from the mutual effect of a whole set 
of factors, including economic growth, pronatalist and family-related policies, 
declining tempo distortions in fertility, higher immigrants’ fertility in some cases, and 
also other factors that are not analyzed here. We analyzed these factors in separation 
and cannot easily separate one from another. The major difference between the ‘ever 
lowest-low” and ‘never lowest-low’ fertility countries was either in the underlying 
lower fertility level (net of tempo effect) in the former group (especially in Southern 
Europe, Eastern Europe and East Asia), or the more intensive postponement of 
childbearing and stronger tempo effects in the former group (especially Central 
Europe), or a combination of both factors (especially during the period of lowest-low 
fertility).  
 
The end of wide-spread levels of extremely low fertility does not mean an end to the 
need to research fertility trends in the developed world. Here we list some of the 
topics we feel need more study. First, we have seen here that in many countries there 
appears to have been a strong relationship between economic trends and fertility. This 
is not generally what has been found for earlier periods (Ermisch 1990). More needs 
to be known about the relationship between economic conditions and fertility, 
including whether births are postponed during difficult economic times or foregone 
altogether. A further issue here is whether fertility policies such as generous paid-
parental leave for employed mothers may strengthen the pro-cyclical nature of 
fertility, depending on the ease or difficulty of obtaining full-benefit employment 
(Adserà 2004). 
 
Second, more demographic modeling work needs to be done on the issue of cohort 
postponement and recuperation and the measurement of tempo effects. The recent 
increase in the TFR can be largely interpreted as a cohort-driven process: while 
younger cohorts of women born in the late 1970s and the early 1980s gradually 
ceased postponing childbearing to ever-later ages, somewhat older cohorts born in the 
early and mid-1970s continued showing signs of a recuperation of their previously 
postponed fertility. This combination of a stabilization of fertility rates among women 
below age 28 and a continuous increase in fertility rates among women past age 28 
has produced much of the observed rise in the TFR (Frejka and Sardon 2009 (see this 
paper for a detailed discussion of recent cohort fertility trends)). Cohort postponement 
even with constant completed cohort fertility can produce the illusion of large 
fluctuations in period quantum as measured by the Bongaarts-Feeney tempo-adjusted 
TFR. This ‘recuperation’ process needs to be studied formally in more detail, and the 
BF period-postponement framework needs to be expanded to include the possibility of 
cohort postponement. Ideally, demographers would figure out ways to distinguish 
between these two kinds of postponement empirically.  
 
  26Third, more research should be conducted on alternative period fertility indicators that 
can complement and even substitute the total fertility rate which is so strongly 
affected by tempo distortion and therefore can give very misleading signals about 
fertility levels, trends and cross-country differences (Ní Bhrolcháin 1992, Sobotka and 
Lutz 2009). 
 
Fourth, the consequences of the era of lowest-low fertility need to be studied. In terms 
of the number of births during these years the question of how much of the decline 
was due to tempo is largely irrelevant. The reality is that generations of small cohorts 
were born in a large number of countries around the world. What will be the 
consequences of smaller generation size for education, labor markets, partnership, and 
parenthood, and also for the size of future generations resulting from somewhat higher 
fertility rates?  
 
Some final words of caution are also in order. First, there is a chance that the current 
study of low-fertility which includes data through 2008 may prove to have been a 
temporary high-water mark and that the current economic crisis will be large enough 
to restart the trend toward low period fertility. We would be surprised by this, but it is 
still possible. Second, we have largely emphasized the role of postponement in 
creating extremely low period fertility rates and setting ground for the recent fertility 
increase. But the reader should also keep in mind that the long-term determinant of 
fertility levels will be changes in fertility quantum, namely cohort fertility. We are 
confident that cohort fertility levels in the analyzed countries will be substantially 
higher than lowest-low period fertility rates. However, cohort fertility of women born 
in the 1970s will be lower than in the past, and it is not impossible that it will continue 
to decline in many countries. 
 
With these caveats in mind, we feel that the bulk of evidence to date points to a 
recovery of period fertility well above lowest-low levels. The mainstream forecasting 
agencies such as the United Nations and Eurostat are likely to be right in their 
prediction that the TFR levels in most countries will rise close to 1.5 or even above in 
the decades ahead. Fears of population implosion based on a continuation of fertility 
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  34TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Countries experiencing the TFR below 1.4 during the period 1984-2008 
  Lowest TFR  TFR in 2008 











Southern Europe  116.1  
Greece 11.2 2001 1.25 1.45
p 0.16 8
Italy   59.6 1995 1.19 1.41
p  0.22 12
Spain 45.3 1998 1.16 1.46
p  0.23 10
Western Europe  82.2  
Germany 82.2 1994 1.24 1.38 0.14  4
      East Germany  14.5 (est.)  1994 0.77 1.40 0.63 13
      West Germany  67.7 (est.)  1985 1.28 1.37 0.10 2
Central Europe  65.8  
Czech Republic  10.3 1999 1.13 1.50 0.37  11
Hungary 10.0 2003 1.27 1.35
p 0.08  3
Poland 38.0 2003 1.22 1.40
e 0.18  5
Slovakia 5.4 2002 1.19 1.32 0.14  8
Slovenia 2.0 2003 1.20 1.53
p 0.33  11
Eastern and south-eastern Europe and the former USSR  
Bulgaria 7.6 1997 1.09 1.48 0.39  10
Romania 21.4 2002 1.25 1.35 0.10  6
Estonia 1.3 1998 1.21 1.66 0.45  3
Latvia 2.3 1998 1.10 1.45  0.35  10
Lithuania 3.4 2002 1.24 1.47  0.23  5
Belarus 9.7 2004 1.20 1.42 0.22  9
Moldova 3.6 2002 1.21 1.28 0.06  7
Russia 142.0 1999 1.16 1.51
p 0.35  10
Ukraine 46.2 2001 1.08 1.46 0.38  10
Armenia 3.2 2000 1.11 1.42
2 0.31 4
Eastern Asia  210.9  
Hong Kong   7.0 2003 0.90 1.06 0.16 17
Japan 127.8 2005 1.26 1.37 0.11 3
Korea 48.3 2005 1.08 1.19 0.11 7
Singapore 4.8 2005 1.26 1.28 0.02 6
Taiwan 23.0 2007 1.09 1.05 .. 6
Countries that have ever experienced TFR<1.4    
Austria 8.3 2001 1.33 1.41 0.08  ..
Croatia 4.4 2003 1.33 1.47 0.14  ..
Cuba 11.2 2006 1.39 1.43
2 0.04  ..
Denmark 5.5 1983 1.38 1.89 0.51  ..
Georgia 4.3 2005 1.39 1.45
2 0.06  ..
Portugal 10.6 2007 1.33 1.37
p 0.03  ..
Switzerland 7.6 2001 1.38 1.48 0.10  ..
Selected other low-fertility countries   
Australia 21.2 2001 1.73 1.93
2 0.20 ..
France (metropolitan)
1) 62.1 1993 1.65 2.00 0.35  ..
The Netherlands  16.4 1983 1.47 1.77
 p  0.30  ..
New Zealand  4.2 2002 1.89 2.18 0.30  ..
Sweden 9.2 1999 1.50 1.91 0.41  ..
United Kingdom  61.3 2001 1.63 1.96 0.33  ..
United States  302.0 (’07) 1976 1.74 2.12
2 0.38 ..
  35 
Notes:  
Computations of the TFR change shown in the table do not necessarily correspond to the computations 
based on the absolute TFR values displayed, as the data shown are rounded to two decimal points. 
1)  Excluding overseas territories; 2) Data pertain to 2007; p) Preliminary data; e) Estimate 
Sources: Council of Europe (2006), own computations based on Eurostat (2009a and 2009b), and 
national statistical offices 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of births to foreign mothers and the period TFR for foreign, 
native and all women in Greece, Italy and Spain, 2005-2006 
Greece 2005  Italy 2007  Spain 2006 
Percent births to foreign mothers  16.5  14.7  16.5 
TFR: native women  1.24  1.28  1.30 
TFR: foreign women  2.12  2.40  1.70 
TFR: total  1.33  1.37  1.35 
Net effect foreign women on the TFR  0.09  0.09  0.05 
Sources: Tsimbos (2008: Table 2) for Greece, ISTAT (2009c) for Italy, and own computations based 
on INE (2009a and 2009b) for Spain.  
Note: National-level TFR is taken from the sources listed above and may therefore differ from our 
computations based mostly on Eurostat (2009a) data.  
 
 
Table 3: The net impact of foreign-women TFR on the period TFR in Spain, 1998-
2006 











1998 1.12  2.42  1.15 0.02  4.2 
2002 1.19  1.77  1.23 0.04  10.6 













Hypothetical TFR in 2006 if foreign-women TFR remained constant at the 1998 level 
 1.30  2.42  1.44  0.14  22.6 
Source: Own computations based on INE (2009a and 2009b).  
Note: Computations presented here show slightly lower TFR values (by 0.01-0.03 in absolute terms), 
than the Eurostat (2009a) data used in the comparative analyses  
 
 
  36Table 4: Contribution of immigrant women to the TFR rise in selected countries of 
Europe 












TFR change: all women  0.09  0.14 0.11 0.23 
TFR change: native women  0.10  0.11 0.08 0.21 
TFR change due to immigrants  -0.01  0.03 0.03 0.01 
Percent change due to immigrants  -15  19 27  5 
Source: Own computations based on Statistics Denmark 2004 and 2008, ONS 2008, Héran and Pison 
2007, and Statistics Sweden 2003 and 2008. 
Notes: 1) Danish data are reported for 5-year periods centered around the years indicated (i.e., 1999-
2003 and 2003-2007); 2) French data pertain to foreign women only and not to all immigrant women  
 










































































































































































































































































































































Sources: Council of Europe (2006), own computations based on Eurostat (2009a and 2009b), and 
national statistical offices.























































































Notes: Small countries with population below 1 million (including Cyprus, Macao, and Malta) are 
excluded. Countries with low-quality data on births and population, including Albania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, are excluded. East and West Germany are counted as separate countries; Hong Kong is 
also considered a separate country. 

























































































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Italy: minimum 1.19 in 1995
North: minimum 1.04 in 1994
Emilia-Romagna: minimum 0.93 in 1987
 
Note: Data for 2007-2008 are preliminary estimates 









  40Figure 5a: Lowest TFR recorded and the TFR in 2008, 26 countries ever 

























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5b: Lowest TFR recorded and the TFR in 2008, developed countries that 


















































































































































































































































































Notes: Scale of the vertical (y) axis differs between the two graphs. Label for each country also shows 
a year when the lowest TFR was reached. 
The 2008 data are preliminary for some countries (see also Table 1); most recent data for Australia, 
Canada, and the United States pertain to 2007. 
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Figure 6: TFR, adjusted TFR, and mean age at first birth, 1985-2007 
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  44Figure 6a: Estimated contribution of tempo and quantum change to the TFR increase 






























































Figure 6b: Estimated contribution of tempo and quantum change to the TFR increase 





























Data for Finland and Norway do not analyse a TFR change from its lowest level reached, but for a 
more recent period of TFR increase for which order-specific TFR data are available 
To make the data as comparable as possible, three-year moving averages were used for both the TFR 
















Figure 10: Number of countries whose governments consider their fertility too low 
















































Sources: UN 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2007. 
Notes: The figure includes all the countries that ever reached the TFR below 1.3 (see Table 3.1) and 
that are listed in the regular UN reports on policies. Germany is treated as one country; data for Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are not available. In 2000, Moldova, Slovakia, and Slovenia did not provide 
information on their fertility and policy view; we used 1998 data instead. 
  47Figure 11:  Relationship between the mean age at first birth and the rate of 





  48Supplementary materials 
 
Appendix 1:  
Describing the estimation of the adjTFR and the adjTFR(est) in the 
last year of observation 
 
The adjusted Total Fertility Rate (adjTFR) is computed as a sum of order-specific 
adjusted Total Fertility Rates (adjTFRi), which take order-specific changes in the 
mean age of fertility schedule, ri(t) as an adjustment factor: 
. Following Bongaarts and Feeney (2000: 563, fn. 1), 
this is estimated as follows: 
)] ( 1 /[ ) ( ) ( t r t TFR t adjTFR i i i − =
2 / )] 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( − − + = t MAB t MAB t r i i i , where MABi(t) is the 
mean age at birth order i, calculated from unconditional age- and order-specific 
fertility rates.  
 
To increase stability in the time series of the adjTFR, which displays large annual 
fluctuations (e.g., Sobotka 2003), we use three-year moving average of the adjTFR 
and compute the adjustment only for birth orders up to 3. The overall adjTFR is then 
estimated as a combination of the adjTFR for birth orders 1 through 3, and the 
ordinary TFR for birth orders 4+:  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 4 3 2 1 t TFR t adjTFR t adjTFR t adjTFR t adjTFR + + + + = .  
This method, omitting an adjustment for birth orders 4+, not only leads to a slightly 
more stable adjTFR, but also reduces the amount of order-specific fertility data 
necessary for the computation. Although it disregards the tempo effect in fourth and 
higher-order fertility rates, the resulting error is negligible, as fourth and higher-order 
births constitute only a small portion of births in low-fertility countries (typically less 
than 10%) and fertility postponement is least pronounced for high-order births (partly 
because these births often take place at late reproductive ages and there is 
consequently less scope for their further postponement). 
 
By applying the Bongaarts and Feeney adjustment, we lose the last year of time series 
and by using a three-year moving average, we lose another year. To obtain more 
recent data for our analysis of the latest fertility trends, we developed a simple 
procedure which allows estimating the adjTFR for an additional year. First, we 
calculate a “crude adjTFR” using ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( − − = t MAB t MAB t r i i i . This method alone is 
fairly unreliable and our analysis of the past data suggests that there can be huge 
instability in this indicator. To improve the last-year estimate slightly, we smooth it by 
computing an average of the last two full observations combined with this very last 
point: 
3 / )] 1 ( _ ) ( ) 1 ( [ ) )( ( + + + − = t adjTFR crude t adjTFR t adjTFR t est adjTFR .  
We must emphasize, however, that the adjTFR(est) is a ‘provisional estimate’. 
Therefore it is plotted separately as a triangle in all country graphs in Figure 6. 
 
  49Appendix 2:  
Estimating lowest-low TFR in the regions of China 
 
The uncertainty about national-level period TFR in China (Retherford et al. 2005; 
Zhang and Zhao 2006, Lutz et al. 2007, Morgan et al. 2009) makes it even more 
difficult to analyze regional fertility differences.
32 We use two different sets of 
estimates of province-level TFR in 2000, based on the 2000 population Census and 
published by National Bureau of Statistics and East-West Center (NBS 2007) and Gu 
et al. (2007, based on NBS 2003). Because both of these datasets are most likely 
distorted downwards by an undercount of young children in the census (e.g., NBS 
2007: 6), we used different thresholds of the published TFR to estimate the number 
and population of provinces with the actual TFR below 1.3. Table S1 shows results 
based on the NBS—East-West Centre dataset.  
 
Table S1: Provinces of China estimated to experience the TFR below 1.30 and their 
population, 2000 (Estimate based on NBS 2007) 
 




Low estimate  below 1.10  6  147.1  11.6 
Medium estimate  below 1.20  8  245.3  19.4 
High estimate  below 1.30  12  464.0  36.7 
Total 30  1265.8  100 
 
The second estimate, based on a dataset by Gu et al. (2007), comes very close in its 
high and low variant, but diverges in the main variant, according to which 32% of 
China population (403 million in total) lived in ten provinces with lowest-low fertility 
(Table S2).  
 
Table S2: Provinces of China estimated to experience the TFR below 1.30 and their 
population, 2000 (Alternative estimate based on Gu et al. 2007) 
 




Low estimate  1.0 or lower  6  179.1  14.2 
Medium estimate  1.1 or lower  10  402.9  31.8 
High estimate  1.2 or lower  12  473.4  37.4 
Total 30  1265.8  100 
 
                                                 
32 The variation in fertility rates between provinces of China is partly fuelled by different province-
level policies specifying whether there are exceptions from a nationwide one-child-per couple policy 
and which ethnic groups and other population groups qualify for these exceptions (Gu et al. 2007).  
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Table S3: Tempo-adjusted TFR, tempo effects and the estimated contribution of 
tempo components to the TFR change between the year of reaching the lowest TFR 
and 2006  
  Lowest TFR  2006 data 
Region / country  year TFR  adjTFR 
tempo 









of tempo to 
TFR change 
(%) 
Southern Europe              
Greece 2001  1.26  1.49 -0.23 1.38 1.53 -0.15 0.04  67 
Spain 1998  1.16  1.43 -0.27 1.37 1.42 -0.05  -0.01  (>100) 
Central Europe                
Czech Republic  1999  1.14  1.66 -0.51 1.35 1.79 -0.44 0.13  37 
Hungary 2003  1.28  1.75 -0.46 1.32 1.69 -0.37  -0.06  (>100) 
Poland 2003  1.23  1.60 -0.37 1.27 1.48 -0.21  -0.12  (>100) 
Slovakia 2002  1.20  1.58 -0.39 1.25 1.67 -0.42  0.09  (<0) 
Slovenia 2003  1.22  1.56 -0.34 1.32 1.58 -0.26  0.02  79 





Eastern and south-eastern Europe and the former USSR     
Bulgaria 1997  1.14  1.38 -0.24 1.37 1.74 -0.37  0.35  (<0) 
Romania 2002  1.26  1.57 -0.31 1.31 1.54 -0.23  -0.03  (>100) 
                    
Estonia 1998  1.24  1.70 -0.45 1.56 1.85 -0.30  0.16  50 
Latvia 1998  1.17  1.54  ('99) -0.4 1.30 1.59 -0.28 0.05  66 
Lithuania 2002  1.26  1.58 -0.32 1.31 1.74 -0.43  0.16  (<0) 
                    
Russia 1999  1.19  1.48 -0.29 1.29 1.50 -0.21  0.02  83 
Ukraine 2001  1.11  1.36 -0.26 1.28 1.46 -0.18  0.10  44 
Japan  2005 1.29  1.43 -0.14 1.30 1.49 -0.19  0.06  (<0) 
Notes: To make the data as comparable as possible, three-year moving averages were used for both the 
TFR and the adjTFR. Therefore the TFR values in this table do not correspond to those shown in Table 
1. The adjTFR for the last year included was estimated using the procedure described in the paper. 
1) Data pertain to 2005; 2) data pertain to 2004. 
 
 
  51Appendix 4:  
Regional differences in the trends in order-specific TFR and the 
contribution of first-order TFR to the overall TFR increase 
 
There is a clear regional differentiation in the pattern of TFR1 changes from the year 
lowest-low fertility was reached. In Southern and Central Europe (except Slovenia), 
the TFR recovery was dominantly driven by an increase in first-order TFR. In 
contrast, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, including Baltic states (except 
Lithuania), an increase in the TFR for second and later births was more prominent 
(Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine), or at least as important as an increase in first-order 
TFR (Russia; see Table S2). This peculiar pattern of fertility recuperation may be 
explained by a widespread postponement of second births and the resulting 
prolongation of second birth intervals in some Eastern European countries after the 
political regime change around 1990. This phenomenon was repeatedly observed in 
Russia and Ukraine (e.g., Barkalov 2005, Perelli-Harris 2005, Philipov and 
Jasilioniene 2008), where first births were initially not postponed as vigorously as in 
other regions of Europe. Since the delay and decline in second birth rates can be 
linked to the economic crisis and uncertainty during the economic and social 
transition in the 1990 (Perelli-Harris 2005), it is not surprising that a sizeable 
economic recovery after 2000 also brought a rapid rise in second and higher-order 
TFR there. In addition, this increase may be also linked to family policies supporting 
larger families. 
 
Table S4: Change in order-specific components of the TFR and the contribution of 
first-order TFR to TFR increase (lowest-low fertility countries with available data) 
 
  Lowest TFR  Most recent 
data 
Absolute changes  Relative changes (year 
of the lowest TFR = 100)
% 
contribution 
TFR1 to the 
TFR rise 
  Year TFR1  Year    TFR1 TFR  TFR1 TFR2+ TFR TFR1 TFR2+
Southern Europe        
Greece 2001 0.60  2007  0.68 0.16 0.09 0.07 113 115 111 55 
Italy   1995 0.60  2004  0.70 0.07 0.09 -0.02 106  115  96 100 
Spain 1998 0.59  2006  0.77 0.22 0.17 0.05 119  129  109 77 
Central Europe          
Czech R.  1999 0.53  2007  0.74 0.36 0.21 0.16 132 140 128 57 
Hungary 2003 0.57  2007  0.62 0.04 0.04 0.00 103  108  100 100 
Poland 2003 0.59  2007  0.65 0.08 0.06 0.02 107  111  103 74 
Slovakia 2002 0.52  2007  0.59 0.07 0.07 0.00 106  112  100 97 
Slovenia 2003 0.60  2007  0.68 0.18 0.07 0.10 115  112  117 42 
Eastern and south-eastern Europe      
Bulgaria 1997 0.63  2007  0.81 0.33 0.18 0.14 130  129  131 57 
Romania 2002 0.64  2007  0.69 0.04 0.05 -0.01 103  108  99 100 
Estonia 1998 0.65  2007  0.76 0.42 0.11 0.31 135  117  155 27 
Latvia 1998 0.57  2006  0.68 0.26 0.11 0.14 123  120  127 45 
Lithuania 2002 0.61  2007  0.70 0.12 0.09 0.03 110  115  104 78 
Russia 1999 0.68  2006  0.75 0.14 0.07 0.07 112  110  115 50 
Ukraine 2001 0.65  2007  0.74 0.25 0.10 0.16 124  115  136 39 
Japan  2005 0.62 2007  0.66 0.08 0.03 0.04 106  106  107 45 
Note: Computations of the absolute and the relative changes in the TFR shown in the table do not 
necessarily correspond to the computations based on the absolute TFR values displayed, as the data 
shown are rounded to two decimal points. 
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The trajectories of changes in TFR1 and the mean age of mother at first birth during 
the ‘postponement transition’ in selected lowest-low fertility countries is graphically 
displayed for selected countries in Figure S1. The graphs are shown separately for the 
former communist countries with initially very early first birth pattern, and for 
Southern European and East Asian countries (see also Sobotka 2004b: 180-182). 
Denmark and the Netherlands are added for an illustration as well.
33 Most of the 
analyzed countries indeed seem to follow the outlined trajectory quite well, although 
there are some irregular ups and downs, especially in Russia, Taiwan, and in 
Denmark. All the analyzed countries except Russia have already moved toward the 
‘late’ first birth pattern; however, by 2007, most analyzed countries have not reached 
the envisioned final stage of the TFR1 recovery above 0.75. The Netherlands 
constitutes an ‘ideal case’ of the complete pathway, whereas Spain shows a recent 
upsurge in the TFR1 above the threshold of 0.75. A future completion of this final 
stage in first birth timing transition is likely to push the TFR further upwards, 
although in some countries, especially Japan, first birth rates may eventually stabilize 
at the lowest-low levels. 
 
                                                 
33 The two graphs have a different dividing line between the ‘early’ and the late’ first birth pattern (at 
ages 25 and 27, respectively), reflecting differences in the mean age at first birth at the onset of first 
birth postponement.  
  53Figure S1: Transition from an early to the late age at first birth and the first-
order TFR 
a) Selected lowest-low fertility countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech 
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Figure S2: Three examples of the turn-around in low fertility along with the time 
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Our approach shows how tempo-adjustment using the period-based methods of 
Bongaarts and Feeney performs when confronted with ‘cohort postponement.’ A 
simple stylized case illustrates what is going on, particularly the way in which at the 
end of the transition births increase as cohorts ‘recuperate’ their postponed fertility. 
This recuperation increases the period TFR, but, because it drives up the mean age of 
birth, is mistaken by a period-adjustment procedure as evidence of further 
postponement. The result is a brief dramatic increase in the tempo-adjusted TFR in 
the latter phases of the transition. 
 
In the simplest case, we have just three age classes, with fertility occurring equally in 
classes 1 and 2 before the transition and equally in classes 2 and 3 afterwards. The 
transition occurs from one cohort to the next. For computational convenience, we 
assume one birth in each of two age classes, for a total fertility of two births over each 
cohort. The reader can also interpret these as rates of 1 birth per time period lived, 
with a lifetime TFR of 2 births. 
 
The following table illustrates this simple case: 
 
  Births in period t 
Period  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age class     
III  0 0 0 0 1 1 
II  1 1 1 1 1 1 
I  1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total  2 2 1 1 2 2 
Mean  age  1.5 1.5  2  2 2.5 2.5 
d/dt mean
*   0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25   
Tempo-adj  total 2 2.67 1.33 1.33 2.67  2 
Note: 
*Here we have centered the pace of postponement, as recommended by Bongaarts and Feeney. If 
we use simply the lagged change in the mean, this shifts quantum fluctuations in time but in this case 
increases their magnitude. 
 
 
We see that the postponement transition causes fertility to drop rapidly and then rises. 
The effect of the first postponing cohort is seen in period 3, as the cohort entering age 
class I postpones its fertility. The result is that the total number of births falls by half 
from period 2 to 3 and remains as low during period 4. Recuperation occurs in period 
5, and total period births resume their earlier level, equal to cohort totals. 
 
The period-based method of Bongaarts and Feeney does very well when averaged 
over very long periods of time but can be misleading about short-term changes. Over 
the entire course of the transition (here from periods 1 to 6) tempo-adjusted period 
fertility averages 2 births, exactly equal to cohort fertility. However, during the time 
when births are being postponed, each period’s adjusted fertility differs systematically 
from the benchmark cohort measure of quantum. Specifically, at the beginning of the 
  56transition (in period 3), the tempo-adjustment to 2.67 is too large, making it look as if 
the quantum of fertility has increased. During the middle of the transition (in periods 4 
and 5), the adjustment to 1.33 is too small, giving the appearance of large declines (33 
to 50%!) in the quantum of fertility. Finally, at the end of the transition, the 
recuperation of fertility makes it appear to the BF method as if there is continued 
postponement because the mean age increases from periods 4 to 5. This produces an 
overestimate of quantum for period 5.  
 
The combined effect of underestimation of quantum in the midst of the transition and 
overestimation of quantum toward its end produces the impression of an enormous 
increase in quantum. This appearance of large quantum swings is attributable to the 
BF model’s assumption that postponement is happening on a period, not a cohort 
basis. It thus uses period measures of change in the mean age, an approach which can 
produce misleading results during the whole course of postponement transition.  
 
The above example illustrates what can go wrong when the period-based BF approach 
is applied to demographic change that is fundamentally of cohort character. To see the 
potential magnitude of error with realistic fertility schedules and paces of 
postponement, we performed an additional simulation. In the simulation, we have 
used an age schedule of fertility based on the schedule of the French cohort of 1945; 
differently from Section 8.1 above we look at all birth orders combined. Rather than 
sudden change from one cohort to the next, we assumed that postponement transition 
happened gradually over 10 cohorts, increasing the cohort mean age at childbearing 
from about 24 to about 27. This cohort transition produces an increase in the period 
schedule by the same amount over the course of about 30 years. In order to make the 
simulation relevant for lowest-low fertility, the cohort quantum of fertility was kept 
constant at 1.6 children per woman. 
 
The first panel of Figure S3 shows the entire Lexis surface during the cohort transition 
of fertility to older ages. We see that the change happens over a narrow number of 
cohorts but a wider number of periods. The verisimilitude of the simulation can be 
seen in the path of the observed TFR shown in the second panel. The period TFR 
begins at 1.6 and then falls rapidly to lowest-low levels, under 1.3, where it remains 
for about a decade. Full recovery of period fertility then occurs over an additional two 
decades. 
 
The rise in the mean age of the period schedule is shown in panel 3, along with the 
pace of postponement in panel 4. The mean rises rapidly as the transition begins 
because the youngest women are suddenly bearing many fewer children. The pace of 
postponement slows after ten years, when postponement effectively ends at the 
younger ages. About 20 years after the first cohort began postponement we see that 
the pace of period postponement briefly picks up again. This is the result of 
‘recuperation’, when the first postponing cohorts reach older ages and fertility rates at 
old ages thus begin to increase. After about 50 years the transition comes to an end. 
 
The Bongaarts-Feeney tempo-adjusted TFR produced by this more realistic cohort-
postponement transition is shown by the dashed line in the panel with the TFR (Panel 
2). We see qualitatively the same M-shaped pattern in tempo-adjusted fertility that we 
saw in the simple tabular illustration above: first an overestimate, then an 
underestimate, and finally again an overestimate of quantum. Our simulation allows 
  57us to see that the magnitudes of over and underestimation can be large. There appears 
to be a large decline in quantum of something between 0.2 and 0.4 children during the 
postponement (depending on whether one takes seriously the early rise in tempo-
adjusted TFR or not). This is what appears to have happened in many lowest-low 
fertility countries. Then as postponement continues there is a rise in quantum that is 
nearly equally dramatic, also what we observe in many cases when lowest-low 
fertility came to an end. 
 
These examples are illustrative of what can happen if postponement is purely of a 
cohort nature. More work needs to be done to apply such models to real-world fertility 
change, but we believe that the story of cohort recuperation here is a potentially large 
part of the explanation for why there appear to be substantial increases in quantum, as 
estimated with the BF adjustment, in the later stages of the postponement transition. It 
may also be responsible for some of the apparent rise and decline in quantum during 
the early stages of postponement and fertility decline. The Bongaarts-Feeney 
adjustment works on average, over the course of 50 years in our example, but can be 
systematically misleading over periods lasting a decade or more.
34 
 




                                                 
34 These errors are systematic in that they are driven by a violation of the proportionality assumption of 
period-based tempo effects. The BF adjustment as well as other methods that have been proposed are 
also susceptible to large year-to-year fluctuations, which are conventionally smoothed. Smoothing 
could in theory correct the errors we see here but it would have to be so great as to hide all ups and 
downs in fertility lasting less than a generation or so in length. 
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